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DEFECTIVE MILITARY AIRCRAFT AND THE
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTIES THAT
ARISE EVEN AFTER BOYLE V. UNITED
TECHNOLOGIES CORP.
G. NELSON SMITH, III*
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT spends literally bil-
lions of dollars on military equipment each year.' Un-
fortunately, many military products, like those sold to
ordinary consumers, contain defects which can injure or
kill. 2 Sometimes, injury or death results from a design de-
fect that is prevalent in all streams of commerce, includ-
ing the military. Consequently, the manufacturer is
unable to escape liability. An example of such product is
B.A., magna cum laude, 1982, Howard University; J.D. 1986, University of
Virginia.
Note, Liability of a Manufacturer For Products Defectively Designed by the Government,
23 B.C.L. REV. 1025 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Liability of a Manufacturer]; see also
Note, Government Contract Defense: Sharing the Protective Cloak of Sovereign Immunity
After McKay v. Rockwell International Corp., 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 181, 181 n.3 (1985)
[hereinafter Note, Government Contract Defense] (stating that based on U.S. budget
for fiscal year 1983, the procurement cost for military equipment for fiscal year
1984 was estimated to be approximately 70 billion dollars).
" See Note, Liability of a Manufacturer, supra note 1, at 1025.
Id. In recent lawsuits, several courts have determined that the defendants
may be held liable because they failed to show that defects in military equipment
were not a result of negotiations between the defendants and the military. In
their holdings, the courts readily implied that liability of designers in military
products liability cases is derived from the designers' inability to prove that the
alleged defect is not in the ordinary stream of commerce. In Johnston v. United
States, 568 F. Supp. 351 (D. Kan. 1983), the employees of a business engaged in
the repair and overhaul of military aircraft instruments brought an action against
the manufacturer alleging that these defective instruments caused the employees
to contract cancer or leukemia.Johnston, 568 F. Supp. at 351-52. The manufactur-
ers argued that the instruments were produced according to the specifications of
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a can of tainted beans which, if sold to the military, would
hold the manufacturer legally responsible.4
On other occasions, however, the military products sold
by manufacturers must be "stepped up" from their nor-
mal performance level to ultra-high or maximum per-
formance levels, in order to enhance defense and ensure
the safety of the country.5 This process is usually a reflec-
the United States Government. Id. at 353. The court, however, rejected this ar-
gument. Id. at 356-59.
4 In McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1043 (1984), the court recognized the difficulty encountered in deter-
mining what products are "military equipment" and which products are those in
the ordinary stream of commerce:
We recognize that the term "military equipment" is somewhat im-
precise, and that at some point lines will have to be drawn. We need
not do so here. The line, however, lies somewhere between an ordi-
nary consumer product purchased by the armed forces - a can of
beans, for example - and the escape system of a Navy RA-5C recon-
naissance aircraft. The latter falls within the term while the former
does not.
Id. at 451. The court in McKay was reluctant to determine the meaning of the
term "military equipment."
This principle was explicitly outlined by the Ninth Circuit:
[I]t should be noted that in setting specifications for military equip-
ment, the United States is required by the exigencies of our defense
effort to push technology towards its limits and thereby to incur risks
beyond those that would be acceptable for ordinary consumer
goods. A supplier is frequently unable to negotiate with the United
States to eliminate those risks.
McKay, 704 F.2d at 449-50. The McKay court derived this principle by interpret-
ing In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on
other grounds, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984). In In
re Agent Orange, Vietnam soldiers brought suit against the manufacturer of the con-
taminated defoliant "Agent Orange" for injuries sustained as a result of exposure
to the defective product. In Re Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at 768-69. In language
similar to that of McKay, the court stated:
Where, as here, manufacturers claim to have been compelled by fed-
eral law to produce a weapon of war without ability to negotiate
specifications, contract price or terms, the potential for unfairly im-
posing liability becomes great. Without the government contract
defense a manufacturer capable of producing military goods for gov-
ernment use would face the untenable position of choosing between
severe penalties for failing to supply products necessary to conduct a
war, and producing what the government requires but at a contract
price that makes no provision for the need to insure against poten-
tial liability for design flaws in the government's plans.
Id. at 794; see also Note, Government Contractor Defense To Strict Products Liability, 49 J.
AIR L. & COM. 671, 686-88 (1984) (discussing the three-part test used by the In re
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tion of either a military contract between the government
and a private corporation 6 or a contractual specification
between the same two parties.7 The specification may be
Agent Orange court to determine availability of the government contractor de-
fense).
This policy of pushing technology beyond that used in ordinary consumer
products was continued in 1986, when, on May 27, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals decided Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d 413 (4th Cir.
1986), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988), Dowd v. Textron, Inc., 792 F.2d 409 (4th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988), and Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d
403 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988), all of which involved
wrongful deaths that occurred as a result of defective military equipment.
6 See Note, Liability of a Manufacturer, supra note 1, at 1032, 1048-64. The con-
tract between the contractor and the government is extremely important in order
to give the contractor the authority to modify a product that is used in the ordi-
nary stream of commerce. This privy relationship forms the basis for the govern-
ment contractor defense. For a better understanding of the this defense, see infra
notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
See id. at 1031-48. This is also known as the "government specifications de-
fense". Initially, both defenses were recognized and had entirely different mean-
ings. The government specifications defense, as noted by one author,
allows a contractor to escape liability for the defective design of a
product it manufactures if the contractor has fully complied with
government's specifications, the injury complained of is attributable
to a flaw in the specifications, and the specifications were not so ob-
viously defective and dangerous that a competent contractor would
not have followed them.
Id. at 1027. The same author noted that the government contractor defense, as a
more complete defense, "provides a type of immunity to a public contractor who
performs in accordance with government specifications." Id. Under the tradi-
tional approach, the government specifications defense was a defense available in
negligence actions and the government contractor defense was claimed in breach
of warranty and strict liability actions. See McLaughlin v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 148
Cal. App. 3d 203, 195 Cal. Rptr. 764 (Ct. App. 1983) (Wiener, J., concurring and
dissenting) (discussed infra notes 207-213 and accompanying text). In McLaugh-
lin, Judge Wiener stated, "Sikorsky appears to concede the correctness of the
principle recognizing the contract specification defense has its source in ordinary
negligence principles and accordingly does not apply to actions grounded in strict
liability." Id. at 214, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 770.
The belief of the court in McLaughlin was consistent with the views outlined in
Johnston, where the court, making the differences between the government specifi-
cations defense and the government contractor defense crystal clear, argued:
[T]he contract specification defense applies to products manufac-
tured to the other and specification of another, whether that other
be the government or a private party. Under this defense, which is
based on ordinary negligence principles, a contractor is not liable
for damages resulting from specifications provided by his employer
unless those specifications are so defective and dangerous that a rea-
sonably competent contractor "would realize that there was a grave
chance that his product would be dangerously unsafe."
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"minimal or detailed, quantitative or qualitative, general
or specific." 8 They may also range from "meticulous de-
scriptions of each bearing and bushing required, to vague
hopes for 'simple' or 'failsafe' products." 9
Whenever there is an enhancement to an aircraft, that
enhancement must be approved by the government.10
This may be accomplished in many ways. For example,
the government may provide the specification and require
the contractor to manufacture the product in accordance
with the specification in order to receive the contract.'1
This is known as the "compulsion requirement."' 12 The
government may also approve the specification designed
by the contractor,' 3 either by implicit acceptance of the
Johnston, 568 F. Supp. at 354 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 404
comment a (1965)). The court continued by distinguishing the two defenses:
"[U]nlike the contract specification defense, the government contract defense is
not based on ordinary negligence principles, and applies only where the product
in question has been manufactured pursuant to a contract with the government."
Id. at 356.
In recent cases, however, the government contractor defense has been applied
in both negligence and strict liability actions making the specifications defense
virtually obsolete, as evidenced by Boyle, Dowd, and Tozer. Thus, because one of
the purposes of this note is to track the development of the government contrac-
tor defense, this note will treat the government contractor defense and the gov-
ernment specifications defense as the same.
Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 745 (11 th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988).
9 Id.
lo Id. at 746. See generally 14 C.F.R. § 43 (1988) (regulations concerning the
maintenance, preventive maintenance, rebuilding, and alteration of aircraft).
1 Note, Liability'of a Manufacturer, supra note 1, at 1026.
2 See, e.g., Hendrix v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1551 (N.D.
Tex. 1986). The court stated, "Bell was obligated to manufacture the helicopter
in strict accordance with these specifications and had no authority to deviate from
the approved design specifications without first obtaining approval from the
Army. Failure to follow these specifications ... would constitute a default under
the contract." Id. at 1556 (citations and footnote omitted).
13 See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d 413, 414 (4th Cir. 1986),
vacated, 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988); Dowd v. Textron, Inc., 792 F.2d 409, 412 (4th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988); Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 405
(4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988); Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol,
Div. of Boeing Co., 755 F.2d 352, 354-55 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821
(1985); In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim Ger. on Sept. 11, 1982, 769 F.2d
115, 121 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp., 704 F.2d 444, (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); Wilson v.
Boeing Co., 655 F. Supp. 766, 772 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Powell v. Boeing Vertol Co.,
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equipment 14 or through the back-and-forth conversations
between the military and the contractor.' 5 Either way, if
the product is enhanced or "stepped up" for military pur-
poses, and a military employee 16 or civilian t7 is injured
or killed as a result of the defective design of this en-
hancement, then the manufacturer may escape liability
under the "government contractor defense."'' 8
The government contractor defense, as it is routinely
known,' 9 applies only where the product in question has
been manufactured pursuant to a contract with the gov-
ernment.20 This defense has been characterized as one
that "allows the contractor to 'share' the government's
immunity from suit on grounds of public policy."'2 ' The
defense generally "shields a manufacturer from liability
when such work is performed in accordance with govern-
ment specifications absent any willfully tortious conduct
by the independent contractor. 22
Over recent years, this defense has received a great deal
of attention, particularly as it relates to alleged defects in
military aircraft. Thus, the purpose of this casenote is a
narrow one which concentrates solely on the historical de-
velopment of the government contractor defense as ap-
plied to defective military aircraft. More importantly, this
article does not purport to determine whether or not the
No. 84-5503, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 1986) (1986 Westlaw 13840); Hubbs v.
United Technologies, 574 F. Supp. 96, 98 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
14 See Dowd, 792 F.2d at 412; In re Mannheim, 769 F.2d at 123; McKay, 704 F.2d
at 453; Ramey v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 656 F. Supp. 984, 993-95 (D. Md.
1987); Hubbs, 574 F. Supp at 100; In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F.
Supp. 1046, 1056-57 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984).
-5 See Boyle v. United Technologies, 792 F.2d at 414; Tozer, 792 F.2d at 407; Kout-
soubos, 755 F.2d at 355.
lo See supra notes 13-15 and cases cited therein.
17 See Ramey, 656 F. Supp. at 985.
18 See supra notes 1-15 and accompanying text.
19 See supra note 7 for a discussion of the difference between the government
contractor defense and the government specifications defense.
2o See, e.g.,Johnston v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 351, 356 (D. Kan. 1983).
21 Id.; see also Note, Liability of a Manufacturer, supra note 1, at 1049.
22 Estate of Portnoy v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 612 F. Supp. 1147, 1152 (S.D. Miss.
1985).
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defense is appropriate when the government is involved
in the development of the aircraft. That task is left to
other authors.2 3 Rather, this note seeks to examine the
historical development of the government contractor de-
fense and the constitutional and policy ramifications be-
hind the defense as it relates solely to defective military
aircraft.
I. BACKGROUND
The United States military uses several types of aircraft,
ranging from dirigibles, 24 to helicopters, 25 to single-en-
gine airplanes, 26 to jet fighters27 traveling well beyond the
23 A great number of articles deal with the application and feasibility of the
government contractor defense and, unfortunately, it would be virtually impossi-
ble to name them all. For several of the articles available on the subject, however,
see supra note 1 as well as Turner & Sutin, The Government Contractor Defense: When
Are Manufacturers of Military Equipment Shielded from Liability for Design Defects?, 52 J.
AIR L. & CoM. 397 (1986); Note, The Government Contractor Defense and Manufacturers
of Military Equipment: McKay v. Rockwell International Corporation, 21 Hous. L. REV.
855 (1984); Note, Government Contractor Defense to Strict Products Liability, 49J. AIR L.
& COM. 671 (1984); Note, McKay v. Rockwell International Corp.: No Compulsion Re-
quired for Government Contractor Defense, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1061 (1984); Note,
Schoenborn v. Boeing Co.. The Government Contractors Defense Becomes a "Windfall"for
Military Contractors, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 287 (1985); Comment, The Government
Contract Defense in Products Liability Cases, 34 NAVAL L. REV. 157 (1985); Comment,
Strict Product Liability Suits for Design Defects in Military Products: All the King's Men; All
the King's Privileges?, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 117 (1984).
24 See Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y.
1964), aff'd, 392 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1968) (plaintiffs alleged negligence in manufac-
ture and in proper seaming of a dirigible which crashed, resulting in the death of
servicemen).
25 See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1986), va-
cated, 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988); Dowd v. Textron, Inc., 792 F.2d 409 (4th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988); Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, Div. of Boeing
Co., 755 F.2d 352 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821 (1985); Shaw v. Grumman
Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2896
(1988) (rejected by Supreme Court in Boyle); Ulmer v. Hartford Accident & In-
dem. Co., 380 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1967); Wilson v. Boeing Co., 655 F. Supp. 766
(E.D. Pa. 1987); Powell v. Boeing Vertol Co., No. 84-5503 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 1986)
(1986 Westlaw 13840); McLaughlin v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 148 Cal. App. 3d 203,
195 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1983); see also Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div. United Air-
craft Corp., 425 F. Supp. 81 (D. Conn. 1977), aff'd on reconsideration, 505 F. Supp.
1049 (1981) (wrongful death action against manufacturer of a military helicopter
which crashed, killing two Marine Corps officers).
2 See McCullough v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 587 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1979) (an
experienced military pilot, flying a single engine aircraft as part of a United States
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speed of sound. 8 Because the military uses so many dif-
ferent aircraft, each modified to conform to military
needs, 9 design defects occur frequently. These defects
have ranged from improper seaming of a balloon,3 0 to de-
fective rotor systems in helicopters,' to malfunctioning
ejection seats in airplanes.3 2 As a result of the diversity of
aircraft and potential defects, the elements used to estab-
lish the government contractor defense vary dramatically
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 3
Initially, however, the development of the sovereign im-
munity concept travelled one uniform path. Historically,
the government contractor defense derived its sovereign
immunity status from the medieval doctrine that the mon-
arch ruled by divine right and that the king could do no
wrong.34 While America repudiated the political theory
that "the King can do no wrong," a legal doctrine derived
from it: "the Crown was immune from any suit to which it
had not consented. ' 3- This privilege was later "invoked
on behalf of the Republic and applied by our courts as
vigorously as it had been on behalf of the Crown. ' '3 6 In
1821, for example, the Supreme Court decided Cohens v.
Army reserve program, died when, as indicated by circumstantial evidence, he ran
out of fuel in one tank but did not switch to the available fuel in second tank).
27 See Ramey, 656 F. Supp. at 984; Tozer, 792 F.2d at 403; Shaw, 778 F.2d at 736;
North Am. Aviation, Inc. v. Hughes, 247 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1957); Kropp v. Doug-
las Aircraft Co., 329 F. Supp. 447 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
28 Here, with speed and other parameters being increased on military jets, it is
implicit that these jets may reach speeds well beyond the speed of sound.
29 See infra note 30-32 and accompanying text.
-1 See Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y.
1964), aff'd, 392 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1968).
3 See Dowd, 792 F.2d at 409; In re Mannheim, 769 F.2d at 115; Hendrix, 634 F.
Supp. at 1551; Ulmer, 380 F.2d at 549; Melton v. Borg-Warner Corp., 467 F. Supp.
983 (W.D. Tex. 1979).
32 See McKay, 704 F.2d at 444; Ramey, 656 F. Supp. at 984; Church v. Martin-
Baker Aircraft Co., 643 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Mo. 1986).
33 Compare Tozer, 792 F.2d at 403 and McKay, 704 F.2d at 444 with Shaw, 778
F.2d at 736 and Koutsoubos, 755 F.2d at 352. In addition, several different views on
the government contractor defense are explained later in this article.
34 See Note, Government Contract Defense, supra note 1, at 187; see also Feres v.
United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950).
Feres, 340 U.S. at 139.
" Id.
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Virginia,3 7 which established this sovereign immunity doc-
trine without citing any authority or explanation. 38
One hundred and twenty-five years later, however,
Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).3 9
Under the FTCA, the government agreed to be sued for
its wrongs where a private person would have been liable
under like circumstances.4 0 The primary purpose and ra-
tionale for the FTCA was to extend a remedy to those
who had been without one.4' The FTCA, however, did
not do away with governmental immunity entirely, nor
was this its intention.42 For example, Congress explicitly
3" 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 411-412 (1821).
- Id. at 412; see also, Note, Government Contractor Defense to Strict Products Liability,
supra note 23, at 675-76.
. 39 Here, the Congress passed several acts which permitted the government to
be sued. They include 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2402, 2411-
12, and 2671-80 (1982).
40 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346.
41 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950).
42 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680, which states the following exceptions which exclude the
government from being sued.
Particular Proceedings § 2680. Exceptions The provisions of this
chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to -
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the dis-
cretion involved be abused.
(b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent trans-
mission of letters or postal matter.
(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of
any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods or merchan-
dise by any officer of customs or excise or any other law-enforce-
ment officer.
(d) Any claim for which a remedy is provided by sections 741-752,
781-790 of Title 46, relating to claims or suits in admiralty against
the United States.
(e) Any claim arising out of an act or omission of any employee of
the Government in administering the provisions of sections 1-31 of
Title 50, Appendix.
(f) Any claim for damages caused by the imposition or establish-
ment of a quarantine by the United States.
[(g) Repealed Sept. 26, 1950, ch. 1049, § 13(5), 14 Stat. 1943.]
(h) Any claim arising our of assault, battery, false imprisonment,
false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander,
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excluded from liability any claim arising out of "combat-
ant activities" during time of war.43 The courts reasoned
that this defense was necessary; otherwise, manufacturers
might withhold essential equipment from the military be-
cause they considered the design to be imprudent or dan-
gerous.44 This was one of the main policy reasons behind
the establishment of the government contractor defense
as applied to military aircraft.45
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTOR DEFENSE As IT RELATES TO
MILITARY AIRCRAFT
Although the government contractor defense was not
articulated as such in military aviation cases until 1982,46
there were, nevertheless, many legal precedents which
dealt with the problems that arise in enhancing military
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights: Pro-
vided, That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law
enforcement officers of the United States Government, the provi-
sions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall apply to
any claim arising, on or after the date of the enactment of this pro-
viso, out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse
of process, or malicious prosecution. For the purpose of this sub-
section, "investigative or law enforcement officer" means any officer
of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches,
to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.
(i) Any claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the
Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary system.
(j) Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or
naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.
(k) Any claim arising in a foreign country.
(1) Any claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley
Authority.
(m) Any claim arising from the activities of the Panama Canal
Company.
(n) Any claim arising from the activities of a Federal land bank, a
Federal intermediate credit bank, or a bank for co-operatives.
Id.
43 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j).
4 Casabianca v. Casabianca, 104 Misc. 2d 348, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400, 402 (Sup. Ct.
1980); see Turner & Sutin, supra note 23, at 407 n.62-69.
4. See Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, Div. of Boeing Co., 755 F.2d 352, 354 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821 (1985); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d
444, 448 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
-- Koutsoubos, 755 F.2d at 355.
448 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [54
aircraft. Ultimately, these decisions helped to develop the
public policy rationale behind the defense.
In 1957, the Ninth Circuit decided North American Avia-
tion, Inc. v. Hughes.47 In Hughes, an F-86F aircraft manufac-
tured by the appellant and piloted by the decedent,
Lieutenant Fred L. Hughes, crashed at the west end of the
Los Angeles International Airport immediately after take-
off.48 The appellees alleged that the pilot lost control and
crashed because of an explosion in the cockpit and/or
possibly because of the loss of the electrical or hydraulic
system. 49 The manufacturers, however, introduced evi-
dence that both the manufacturer and the Air Force made
independent inspections of the aircraft.5" Yet, the court
of appeals affirmed the lower court's judgment for the
plaintiff, stating:
Although the true cause of the accident will probably re-
main a mystery, there appear substantial evidence to sup-
port the appellee's theory that the crash was due to a
mechanical defect which developed while the machine was
still in the air; in other words, a defect in the manufacture of
the airplane, for which the appellant was responsible. 5 '
Four years later, the same court decided Boeing Airplane
Co. v. Brown,52 in virtually the identical manner as its hold-
ing in Hughes. In Brown, the administrator of the estate
sued the manufacturer of a B-52 jet bomber, alleging that
the wrongful death of Major Albert K. Brown, Sr. oc-
curred as the result of a malfunction in the aircraft's right
front alternator drive. 53 Boeing, however, unlike the ap-
pellant in Hughes,54 concentrated its argument on an im-
47 247 F.2d at 517.
48 Id. at 518.
49 Id. at 521.
5o Id. at 519.
1 Id. at 521.
52 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961).
53 Id. at 312.
247 F.2d at 519. In Hughes, although the government contractor defense ar-
gument was expressed, the defendant contended mainly that it was not negligent
because the decedent committed pilot-error. Id.
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plicit form of the government contractor defense.5
Specifically, Boeing solicited manufacturers to submit
proposals for the design and manufacture of an alternator
drive. 6 The drive was designed and manufactured to
meet required detailed performance specifications pre-
pared by Boeing and approved by the Air Force.5 7 The
trial court made no express finding that Boeing either
knew of, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have
known of, a defect inherent in the design and manufac-
ture of the alternator drive by Thompson Products, Inc.5
Boeing alleged that this omission should have allowed
them to escape liability.5 9 The court, however, rejected
this argument stating:
If Thompson failed to exercise reasonable care in the de-
sign and manufacture of that component, or if Thompson
or Boeing or both failed to exercise reasonable care in in-
specting or testing the component, or if Boeing failed to
exercise reasonable care in installing the component in
the B-52 bomber or in warning the Air Force of any known
defect therein, Boeing is liable for damage proximately
caused thereby.6 °
Boeing further argued that the Air Force, and not Boeing,
should be held negligent, because it approved and ac-
cepted the design for the alternator drive prior to its man-
ufacture, supervised its manufacture, monitored the
qualification and production testing, and accepted the
completed aircraft. 6' The court likewise rejected this ar-
gument, stating that there was nothing in the record to
indicate that the Air Force had actual knowledge of the
defect.6 2 Thus, the court, concentrating not on the
knowledge that the manufacturer possessed but rather on
55 Brown, 291 F.2d at 312.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 313.
59 Id.
o Id.
61 Id. at 317-18.
62 Id. at 319.
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the government's lack of knowledge of the defect, af-
firmed the lower court's decision.63
In 1964, however, the roots of the government contrac-
tor defense were planted in the case of Montgomery v. Good-
year Tire & Rubber Co.64 The plaintiffs in Montgomery
sought recovery in a wrongful death action against the
manufacturer of a dirigible and the manufacturer of a
warning bell device built into the aircraft.65 The plaintiffs
alleged that Goodyear improperly seamed the balloon
and that Edwards Company, Inc. manufactured a faulty
warning system that did not sound when the balloon be-
gan to lose air.66 Goodyear and Edwards sought summary
judgment, alleging that "public policy considerations gov-
erning contracts between the United States Government
and weapons suppliers preclude suits by injured or de-
ceased servicemen against the supplier. '67 They further
argued that some sacrifice must be made in the elements
of safety for newly-developed weapon systems in order to
keep the military ahead in the armaments race.68
Although the court stated that the speed at which the pro-
ject must be completed is no excuse for faulty work,69 the
court did entertain the defendant's government contrac-
tor defense argument, holding that:
The extent of Government control over the actual day-to-
day manufacturing process is not clear. Did Government
personnel prepare the seams of the ship? Did Govern-
ment direct, either by contract or through inspectors, the
exact method to be used to seal the seams? These are ma-
terial questions for the trier of fact to determine before
the proximate cause is known. This alone thwarts sum-
mary judgment.7 °
Id.
64 231 F. Supp. at 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
65 Id. at 449.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 450.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 451.
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The importance of the holding in Montgomery was two-
fold. For the first time, courts began to recognize the im-
portance of the relationship between the contractor and
the military as it related to the development of military
aircraft.7 Of equal importance, however, was the fact that
the court rejected Goodyear and Edwards' summary judg-
ment motion, stating that the exact amount of control that
the private corporations had over the manufacture of the
dirigible was a question of fact and not a question of
law.72
The holding in Montgomery pushed New York into the
forefront in establishing the government contractor de-
fense. In 1971, the New York courts decided two other
important cases which crystallized even further that state's
version of the defense. In the first case, Kropp v. Douglas
Aircraft Co.,73 the plaintiff sought to recover damages for
the wrongful death of Charles R. Kropp, who was killed as
he exited an A3A aircraft. 4 This aircraft was delivered to
the Navy pursuant to Contract No. 63-0540-b,7 5 which
stated that the contractor was "to maintain the aircraft
and equipment 'in accordance with the standard Naval
Aircraft Maintenance Program as administered and di-
rected by the cognizant reporting custodian'. ' 76 The con-
71 See id.
72 See id. The law today is drastically different. Now, cases seldom reach the
jury. As noted supra in the text accompanying note 22, the government contractor
defense shields a manufacturer from liability. Thus, the defense is determined as
a matter of law. See Note, Government Contractor Defense to Strict Product Liability,
supra note 23, at 679-88. The policy reason for making this an issue of law as
opposed to a question of fact is most obvious in Tozer when the court stated:
These are judgments, however, which lay men and women are
neither suited nor empowered to make. There is a danger in trans-
porting the rubric of tort law and products liability to a military set-
ting and military technology. While jurors may possess familiarity
and experience with consumer products, it would be the rare juror
- or judge - who has been in the cockpit of a Navy RF-8G off the
deck of a carrier on a low level, high speed fly-by maneuver.
792 F.2d at 406.
7 329 F. Supp. 447 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
74 Id. at 450.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 451.
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tract provided further that the contractor "return said
property 'to the Government in the same condition as
when received by the Contractor; except for (i) normal
wear and tear .... "-n Since the plaintiff sought to re-
cover against both defendants, claiming negligence and
defective design, the New York Eastern District Court
found it necessary to trace the history of the negotiations
between the government and Douglas.78 In holding the
defendants free from liability, the court accepted the gov-
ernment contractor defense argument, although it did not
mention the defense by name, stating:
Safety is one of the design features and, as such, is gov-
erned by these general design principles. It would be
highly desirable, for example, that a plane such as the A3A
have a "back-up-system," (a duplicate mechanism for each
operating part of the plane) in an attempt to insure 100%
reliability of the plane's systems. However, weight and
size are vital considerations, particularly in military craft.
Every one pound of increased weight of an airplane trans-
lates into six pounds on the over-all configuration, for in-
creased weight increases the wing-load, requires a greater
wing span and a heavier fuel load for the predetermined
non-refueling flight range of the craft. For these and a va-
riety of other reasons, back-up systems (although desira-
ble from the standpoint of safety) are not feasible in every
instance in the design and construction of a military craft
such as the A3A.79
Six months after Kropp, the New York Southern District
7 Id.
78 Id. at 456. The court outlines the entire history of the development of the
A3A contract.
In 1947, the Navy commenced discussions with Douglas' Chief Engi-
neer concerning its desire to obtain a jet-propelled bomber capable
of carrying an atomic bomb and of taking off from and landing on a
Navy [aircraft] carrier. This was to be an aircraft of higher perform-
ance than its AJ bomber (a propeller-driven aircraft) and one of high
performance comparable to that of the B-47. Because the mission of
the contemplated aircraft was to carry and deliver an atomic bomb,
which must be armed while the aircraft is in flight, access from the
cockpit to the bombbay was a sine qua non.
Id.
I9 d.
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Court decided O'Keefe v. Boeing Co. 80 in a similar fashion to
that of its predecessor. In O'Keefe, the plaintiffs brought
suit in a wrongful death and personal injury action for in-
juries sustained to passengers aboard a B-52 bomber. 8'
The plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturer of the aircraft
was liable in negligence and in strict liability for defec-
tively designing and manufacturing a welded bulkhead.8 2
80 335 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
s See id. at 1109.
82 See id. at 1117. The plaintiffs also argued that the defendant was negligent in
specifying and using a welded, rather than a forged, bulkhead; de-
signing a bulkhead with welds in close proximity to each other;
burning a weld relief hole through the bulkhead and thereby creat-
ing local stresses and areas of severe stress concentration; designing
a bulkhead which, because of its geometry, the proximity of the
welds, and existence of the weld relief hold, contained an area of
severe stress concentration; improperly welding, so as to create a
defect; failing to use accepted and available inspection techniques,
such as zyglo, magnaflux, dye penetrant, and x-ray to discover the
existence of flaws or defects; failing to discover the existence of the
defect during the manufacturing process and before the bulkhead
boxed section was completed; removing the web, or part of the web,
from the bulkhead, in all production bulkheads, after the 1954 static
tests showed that a crack developed at 75% of ultimate load; failing
to install an access hole or otherwise make it possible to inspect the
weld relief hole area on the bulkhead, in the design of the aircraft,
even after the 1954 static tests showed that a crack developed there
at 75% of ultimate load; failing to order or recommend the installa-
tion of an access hole, or other adequate means of inspection, after
cyclic tests also demonstrated that a crack developed at the weld re-
lief hole; failing to order or recommend the installation of an access
hole, or other adequate means of inspection, after the Monticello,
Utah accident inJanuary, 1961 when the bulkhead failed at the weld
relief hole area in the same place as the crack had developed in the
1954 static test and in the cyclic tests; failing to take other appropri-
ate measures, such as recommending modifications to or replace-
ment of the welded bulkhead, and relating such modifications or
replacement to the Monticello accident and the occurence [sic] of
cracks in the same area as the Monticello failure, following receipt of
information and opinions indicationg [sic] a weakness of the bulk-
head at the weld relief hole; failing to alert the Air Force to the exist-
ence of a safety in flight problem relating to the bulkhead, and
failing to relate such a problem to the need for a retrofit on B-52s in
service; affirmatively advancing theories on the cause of the Monti-
cello accident to the Air-Force-industry investigating board on that
accident, which theories were known to be tenuous, and contra-
dicted by the known facts and circumstances of that accident; ad-
vancing 'overload' as a cause of the Monticello, Utah accident when
the known weather data would not support such a theory and when
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The court concluded that the issue of design defect was
barred by the six-year statute of limitations, 3 since the
statute began to run not at the date of the crash but at the
date of the delivery of the aircraft to the Air Force. 84
Nevertheless, the court took it upon itself to rule upon
the issues of breach of warranty and strict liability8 5 by ar-
ticulating the development of the aircraft according to
government specifications.8 6 Under this approach, the
court again decided in favor of Boeing by applying an im-
plicit form of the government contractor defense, stating:
it was known that the aircraft had not yawed to the left as it would
have done in an overload situation; affirmatively excluding, from dis-
cussions of the 1655 bulkhead, reference to the Monticello, Utah
failure ... ; ignoring the warnings of Berman, Bennett, and others
that there was an area of severe stress concentration in the bulkhead,
that the Monticello fracture was not unique, and that other aircraft
would fail in the same way, despite knowledge that there was no evi-
dence of overload failure in the form of ductility or permanent def-
ormation on the Monticello fracture face; [and] failure to adequately
review and reconsider the manufacturing processes of the bulkhead,
including the burning of the weld relief hole, following the Monti-
cello accident and failing to discover those processes which were
creating severe stress concentrations.
Id. at 1117-18 (quoting plaintiff's brief).
83 Id. at 1114. The court stated, "The instant action being one for personal
injuries arising from a breach of warranty, it is our opinion that Blessington controls
and, therefore, the applicable Statute of Limitations is six years from the time the
sale was consummated .... " Id.
84 Id. at 1115. The court explained why the statute of limitations began to run
at the date of delivery as compared to the date of sale, stating, "[c]learly, B-406
was not an ordinary item of commerce sold pursuant to an ordinary sales contract.
The court therefore concludes that the date of delivery and not the 'date of sale'
was when the plaintiffs' time began to run." Id. at 1115 n.3.
,- See id. at 1118. The court explicitly decided to determine the issue because of
the hard, diligent work of both parties, stating:
At the outset, the court takes note of the fact that, even if the plain-
tiffs' causes of action based on breach of warranty and/or strict lia-
bility are time-barred, as indeed the court has concluded, failure to
consider these alternate theories on the merits would be to presume
that the court's conflict-of-laws analysis is infallible and to do a dis-
service to both sides who so thoroughly prepared the case.
Id.
86 Id. at 1124. According to the evidence, military planners conceived the de-
sign in the late 1940's. The first prototype of this aircraft flew in 1952. Id. at 1122.
The court allowed introduction of further evidence which established that as of
the date of trial, the B-52's had the best safety record among major aircraft in the
Air Force inventory. Id.
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There is no question, and the court so finds, that ultimate
responsibility for the design and use of the B-52 bomber
rests and always has rested with the United States govern-
ment. The court concludes, however, that this fact, in it-
self, neither exonerates the defendant, nor has it in any
way altered the defendant's duty as a manufacturer in this
case where there has been no showing that the defendant
was totally oblivious of and/or aloof from the genesis of
the design specifications in the first place or that the speci-
fications represented either something less than the up-
permost level of the art or a compromise of safety.8 7
Although New York was in the forefront in establishing
the defense, at least one other jurisdiction, in two sepa-
rate cases, accepted government participation in the con-
tract or control of the aircraft as an element to be
considered. In Ulmer v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. ,88
the plaintiffs sued for the wrongful deaths of three naval
reserve officers, alleging that a defect existed in the blade
spar of the decedents' helicopter.8 9 The Fifth Circuit af-
firmed the lower court's judgment for the manufacturer,
stating that since the Navy had control of the helicopter
from 1952 to 1958, the Navy, and not the manufacturer,
was negligent.90
87 Id. at 1124.
8 380 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1967).
89 Id. at 550-51.
-0 Id. at 551. The court stated:
The insurers note that at least twice during the period from 1952 to
1958, the Navy subjected the blades to "zero time overhauls." This
process involved loosening a cork sealer cap in the blade spar to
clean the inside of the spar tube and application of a chemical to
prevent rusting or scaling. It is the contention of the insurers that
after these overhauls, the Navy negligently failed to replace the
sealer cap in a secure manner so as to prevent the entry of moisture.
From this negligent conduct it is argued that corrosion eventually
resulted leading finally to complete separation .... We conclude
that the jury was not only justified in reaching the conclusion that it
was the Navy that was negligent, but that such a conclusion is com-
pelled by the evidence.
Id. at 551-52. The court stated further that the plaintiffs attempted to win the case
not on the evidence but on sympathy, and, thus, the jury verdict was warranted if
not inescapable. Id. at 552.
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Likewise, in Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp. ,9
the district court and court of appeals fluctuated on sev-
eral different issues before ultimately arriving at a judg-
ment for the manufacturer. In Lindsay, the plaintiff filed
suit for the wrongful death of John Douglas Lindsay, al-
leging that his F-4B jet aircraft caught fire as a result of a
manufacturing defect in the bleed air duct system.9" The
district court held for the defendant, arguing that the
plaintiff failed to show, from a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that the aircraft was defectively designed or manu-
factured. 3 The court of appeals, however, reversed,
stating that the plaintiff should have a right to have the
case heard on the theory of strict liability without proving
the exact defect.94 The case was then remanded to the
district court. 95 The district court, based on the facts, de-
termined that the plaintiff failed to establish the cause of
the crash.9 6 This time the court of appeals refused to
overturn the lower court's ruling.97
The New York and Eighth Circuit cases indicated that
the government contractor defense was developing rap-
idly. Nevertheless, many jurisdictions initially rejected this
defense. In Moyer v. United States,98 the district court at-
tempted to establish a form of the government contractor
defense, only to have it staunchly rejected by the Fifth
Circuit four years later. The plaintiff in Moyer brought
suit against the manufacturer and the United States for an
alleged defect in the ejection seat of an Air Force B-57A
91 331 F. Supp. 257 (E.D. Mo. 1971), rev'd and remanded, 460 F.2d 631 (8th Cir.
1972), on remand, 352 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. Mo. 1972), aft'd, 485 F.2d 1288 (8th Cir.
1973).
92 Id. at 257-59.
'5 Id. at 259.
Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631, 640 (8th Cir.
1972).
95 Id.
- Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 352 F. Supp. 633, 633-34
(E.D. Mo. 1972), aff'd, 485 F.2d 1288 (8th Cir. 1973).
97 Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 485 F.2d 1288 (8th Cir. 1973).
go 302 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D. Fla. 1969), rev'd sub nom. Moyer v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 481 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1973).
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aircraft. 99 The plaintiffs alleged that as a result of a mal-
function, the decedent was propelled one hundred feet
into the air and killed instantly. 00 At the district court
level, the manufacturers filed a motion for a directed ver-
dict, which was granted.10 ' Shortly thereafter, the govern-
ment also filed a motion to dismiss,, claiming immunity
under the discretionary function exception to the
FTCA. 10 2 The district court granted the motion, stating:
As regards the selection of the B-57A type aircraft, and in
particular the ejection seat and ejection mechanism to be
employed in that aircraft, I find that these decisions reflect
choices made on a planning level, which in the most im-
mediate sense, affect the political interests of the
nation. 103
The celebration of the verdict was short-lived, since the
court of appeals reversed both the directed verdict against
the manufacturers 10 4 and the dismissal under the discre-
tionary function exemption of the claim against the
United States. 10 5 With respect to the discretionary func-
Id. at 1236.
Moyer v. Martin Marietta Corp., 481 F.2d 585, 586, 588 (5th Cir. 1973).
lot Moyer, 302 F. Supp. at 1236. The district court failed to explain why a di-
rected verdict was granted. In reversing the lower court, the court of appeals,
applying Florida law, held:
[W]e conclude that the trial court committed error in directing ver-
dicts for the corporate defendants at the close of the plaintiff's evi-
dence. There was sufficient evidence for the jury to determine
whether the aircraft and ejection seat system had been negligently
designed and manufactured, and there was sufficient evidence also
for the jury to determine whether the fatal accident of April 22, 1964
was a type of accident reasonably foreseeable at the time the aircraft
and ejection seat were designed and manufactured. In remanding
this case for another trial we do not intimate any opinion as to the
plaintiff's chances of ultimate success. We hold only that the trial
court should not have directed verdicts for the corporate defend-
ants. The issues of negligence and contributory negligence, foresee-
ability and proximate cause were jury issues.
Moyer v. Martin, 481 F.2d at 594.
102 Moyer, 302 F. Supp. at 1237. For more information concerning the discre-
tionary function exemption, see supra note 42.
,03 Moyer, 302 F. Supp. at 1237.
1- Moyer v. Martin, 481 F.2d at 594; see supra note 101.
., Moyer v. Martin, 481 F.2d at 598.
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tion exemption, the court held:
We agree with the United States that the selection of the
B-57 aircraft by the Secretary of the Air Force constituted
the exercise of a discretionary function. Equally the deter-
mination of the number of such aircraft to be purchased
by the Department of the Air Force also constituted the
exercise of a discretionary function. But, coming down to
the acceptance of a system of the aircraft, such as the pi-
lot's ejection seat and its mechanism, which, if negligently
designed or constructed posed a safety hazard to an indi-
vidual operating the aircraft, we hold that the discretion-
ary function exception's sweep falls short of immunizing
the United States from liability.1"6
Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div., United Aircraft Corp. 107
was also brought on strict -liability and breach of warranty
claims.' The defendants also filed a motion for partial
judgment on the: pleadings or partial summary judg-
ment. 0 9 The motion, however, was not based on the gov-
ernment contractor defense but rather on a related
contractual defense; the defendants argued that warranty
claims sounded in contract in North Carolina and re-
quired a privity relationship between the contracting par-
ties." 0 Consequently, the defendants argued that the
employees lacked the privity to sue."' The defendants
10(i Id.
107 425 F. Supp. 81 (D. Conn. 1977), aff'd on reconsideration, 505 F. Supp. 1049
(1981).
o Id. at 84.
9 Id. at 91.
ito Id. at 84, 89. The defendants' argument was based on Mann v. Henderson,
261 N.C. 388, 134 S.E.2d 626 (1964), in which the North Carolina Supreme Court
stated, "[any recovery for wrongful death must be based ... [on] general rules of
tort liability." Id. at 388, 134 S.E.2d at 629. Since the accident occurred in North
Carolina the defendants sought to apply the law where the accident occurred.
Quadrini, 425 F. Supp. at 89.
II Id. Specifically, the defendants argued "that plaintiffs' contract claims are
barred because a contractual theory of recovery is not available under the North
Carolina wrongful death statute, which governs this case by virtue of [16 U.S.C.]
§ 457," which is applied to claims that arise under a federal statute governing
wrongful deaths within a federal enclave. Id. Section 457 provides:
In the case of the death of any person by the neglect or wrongful act
of another within a national park or other place subject to the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the United States, within the exterior boundaries
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further asserted that North Carolina did not recognize
strict liability actions."t 2 In Quadrini, two Marine Corps
officers were killed when their helicopter crashed within a
federal enclave in North Carolina.' The helicopter was
manufactured by the defendant and sold to the United
States government in Connecticut."14 The court deter-
mined that since strict liability is a tort claim, the gov-
erning law was that of North Carolina.' t5 Consequently,
since North Carolina did not recognize strict tort liability,
the motion to dismiss was granted." 16 However, the court
rejected the motion to dismiss on the breach of contract
claim, since the contractual claims were governed by Con-
necticut law, the state where the contract was made.' ' 7
of any state, such right of action shall exist as though the place were
under the jurisdiction of the State within whose exterior boundaries
such place 'may be; and in any action brought to recover on account
of injuries sustained in any such place the rights of the parties shall
be governed by the laws of the State within the exterior boundaries
of which it may be.
16 U.S.C. § 457 (1982).
112 Quadrini, 425 F. Supp. at 84.
,13 Id.
114 Id.
'1 Id. at 88. The court noted, "[a]bsent federal legislation specifically prescrib-
ing rules of decision for a federal enclave, the law existing at the time of the sur-
render of state sovereignty governs the substantive rights of persons within the
federal territory. The state common law rules in effect at the time of cession also
become the law of the enclave until displaced by act of Congress." Id. (citation
omitted).
1- Id. at 89. In granting the motion, the court stated that a cause of action in
strict liability was not recognized in North Carolina on April 3, 1941, the date the
enclave was formed, nor did the state recognize it on the date of the court's deci-
sion. Id. Therefore, the court held, "[a]bsent some North Carolina rule of law
affirmatively demonstrating the availability of such a claim in 1941, the plaintiffs
fail to state a cause of action. Therefore the motion to dismiss the cause of action
in strict liability is granted." Id.
117 Id. at 90. The court held:
the breach of the relationship entered into by the defendant and the
United States . . . was consummated in Connecticut, whereby the
United States agreed to pay the defendant money in exchange for a
helicopter that was warranted to perform in a certain manner ....
A recovery on an implied or expressed warranty claim without
privity is available under Connecticut law.
Id. The court further stated, "[i]n the absence of a contractual provision setting
forth the parties' choice of law, the contract law of Connecticut, the defendant's
principle place of business and the place of the making of the contract as well as
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The court stated the strong public policy that Connecticut
had of enforcing breach of warranty claims on contracts
made in their state:
Connecticut has an interest in having [its] law applied to
this case, because the State has set forth a social and eco-
nomic policy embodied in its law of warranty that should
govern contractual relationships commenced in Connecti-
cut. Connecticut has an interest in requiring parties who
make representations to other parties within its borders to
adhere to those representations or face legal conse-
quences for the failure to do so. At a minimum, this policy
encourages buyers to enter this state and make contracts
here, secure in the knowledge that the contractual protec-
tions afforded by Connecticut law will be available to
them. "8
Four years later, the district court, on reconsideration of
the defendant's motion to dismiss the breach of contract
claim, denied the motion a second time, stating, "[u]ntil
the Connecticut Supreme Court has had an opportunity
to consider... whether common law privity is an essential
prerequisite to a contractual warranty claim absent an al-
ternative tort action, this court will not deprive these
plaintiffs of a cause of action for breach of warranty."'"19
In McCullough v. Beech Aircraft Corp. ,120 the family of an
Army reserve officer brought suit against a manufacturer
the delivery of the helicopter should govern the warranty claims." Id. at 89. The
court supported this argument by relying on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
FLIc-r OF LAws § 188 (1971). Id. at 89-90. That section provides:
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.., the
contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to
determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and
the place of business of the parties.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 188(2).
"" Quadrini, 425 F. Supp. at 90.
Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div., United Aircraft Corp., 505 F. Supp. 1049,
1053 (D. Conn. 1981).
12o 587 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1979).
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of a single-engine plane used by the National Guard. The
aircraft, a Musketeer Model A23A owned by Chattanooga
Aviation Inc. and rented to the government, crashed near
Camp Shelby, Mississippi, killing Stanley H. McCullough,
an experienced military pilot.12 t Through circumstantial
evidence, the plaintiff sought to establish that the proxi-
mate cause of the accident was an improperly designed
fuel system that lacked adequate instructions on its use
during an emergency. 2 2  The plaintiff further alleged
negligent design, manufacture, failure to warn, breach of
warranty, and strict liability in tort. 23 The district court
granted a directed verdict in favor of the manufacturer of
the component parts and entered judgment on a verdict
in favor of the manufacturers of the airplane, from which
the plaintiffs appealed. 24 Although the court of appeals
reversed concerning the manufacturers of the airplane, 125
they affirmed the directed verdict for the component parts
manufacturer, stating:
The bulletin recommended a five-step fuel injection sys-
tem adjustment procedure to eliminate these difficulties.
Continental sent the bulletin to all Continental parts dis-
121 Id. at 756-57.
122 Id. at 757.
123 Id.
12 Id. at 756-57. Here the court of appeals failed to explain exactly why the
directed verdict was granted. However, the court noted that the appellants' alle-
gation that Continental was liable because it shared the responsibility and pre-
scribed adjustments for some components controlling the smooth operation of
the engine. Id. at 758. The appellants further alleged that they proved primarily
that conflicting versions of the Continental engine manual were published and
that a service bulletin was issued approximately one year before the crash. Id.
125 Id. at 762. The court of appeals determined that, because the judge's in-
structions to the jury included a statement that he did not think there was any-
thing wrong with the design of the plane, the district court had committed
reversible error in its instruction. Id. at 760-61. The appellate court asserted that
this comment removed the question of strict liability for a defectively designed
aircraft from the jury. Id. The court further stated that the testimony of two ex-
perts on the probable actions of the persons in the aircraft as well as the circum-
stantial evidence that included complicated time and distance calculations was
enough to create a question of fact. Id. at 761. Because the district judge only
submitted the issue of failure to warn to the jury, the case had to be reversed
(even though the jury came back with a verdict for the defendants) because the
jury was so misled. Id. at 762.
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tributors, dealers, engine owners, and repair agencies. Un-
like the FAA airworthiness directives, also cited by
appellants, that enumerated particular widespread defects
and required them to be remedied within a specified pe-
riod of time, the Continental service bulletin was distrib-
uted merely to assist persons inspecting and repairing
engines. Appellants failed to demonstrate that the Mus-
keteer flown by McCullough was subject to erratic idle and
poor throttle acceleration response or that these condi-
tions contributed to the accident .... In this case, appel-
lants have failed to show that the engine components
supplied by Continental were defective in design or in
manufacture when they left its control or that a defect in
the component was a proximate cause of Colonel McCul-
lough's injuries. 126
The principle outlined in McCullough was important, as it
noted that no defect in the manual existed because it was
not a required manual. 27 Rather, the manual was an aid
to assist in informing the pilot of potential dangers that
existed with the fuel system.1 28 The opinion further em-
phasized that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the defect
occurred while the parts were in the control of the
defendant. 129
Like McCullough, Vasina v. Grumman Corp. 130 was a case
where control of the aircraft and, specifically, control of
the alleged defect were critical to the court's decision.' 3 1
In Vasina, Lieutenant William Arthur Vasina was killed in
the crash of an aircraft designed and manufactured by
Grumman. 32 A Navy investigation concluded that the
crash was caused by an inflight separation of the left wing
of the aircraft, which had been damaged in Vietnam sev-
eral years prior to the crash and had been repaired .by
126 Id. at 758-59.
127 Id. at 758.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 759.
13o 644 F.2d 112 (2d Cir.), aff'g 492 F. Supp. 943 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
- Id. at 114.
132 Id.
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Navy personnel at that time.133  Grumman argued that the
repair and maintenance of the aircraft by the Navy
amounted to unforeseeable, intervening, and superceding
negligence which absolved Grumman of any negli-
gence. 1 4 Ironically, the New York District Court, unlike
its predecessors in the same jurisdiction, 35 failed to ac-
cept this argument. 36 The Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals agreed, stating that "the Navy's negligence would
have to be substantial, and decisive in the causal chain of
events leading to the crash, in order to eliminate Grum-
man's liability."'' 3 7  The court then determined that this
was a jury question because it related to proximate
cause. 138
III. CONCLUSION CONCERNING THE HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTOR DEFENSE As IT RELATES
TO MILITARY AIRCRAFT
The historical development of the government contrac-
tor defense was both rapid and, admittedly, unclear. Very
seldom was the government contractor defense men-
1,, Id.
134 Id.
1" See supra notes 5, 64-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of earlier
cases in which courts accepted arguments similar to Grumman's.
1- Vasina v. Grumman Corp., 492 F. Supp. 943, 944 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 644 F.2d
112 (2d Cir. 1981).
17 Vasina, 644 F.2d at 114.
8 Id. Appellant Grumman argued that the strict tort liability law applicable to
this case was the wrongful death statute, 16 U.S.C. § 457. Id.; see supra note 111.
Grumman further relied upon the law outlined in Quadrini, to determine that since
the crash occurred on a federal enclave (Boardman Bombing Range, Oregon), the
law in 1846, the year the federal enclave was ceded to the United States, gov-
erned. Vasina, 644 F.2d at 117. This court, however, rejected the argument out-
lined in Quadrini, stating:
The plain language of the provision as drafted, and its later judicial
construction, leads us to conclude that § 457 envisions the applica-
tion of the current substantive law of the surrounding state in ac-
tions for death or personal injury occurring within a federal enclave.
Because our holding agrees with that of the district judge below, we
find no error in his decision to submit to the jury the strict liability
claim made by plaintiff.
Id. at 118.
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tioned by name, 39 and, until 1982, no specific standard
was applied in any case involving military aircraft. 4 ' Yet
the crystallization of the defense became more and more
imminent from 1964 until 1982.'14  The courts in 1964,
for example, only gave consideration to this question on a
case-by-case basis, and stated that a jury could decide
those issues.' 4 2 A few years later, however, under the
,39 For an understanding of the initial interpretation of the government con-
tractor defense, see In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046,
1053 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1067 (1984); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 792
(E.D.N.Y.), rev'don other grounds, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1067 (1984) (Vietnam veterans suing manufacturer of Agent Orange); Casabi-
anca v. Casabianca, 104 Misc. 2d 348, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (plaintiff
serverely injured his hand in his father's pizza shop on a machine built according
to Army specfications for use in WWII field kitchens); Sanner v. Ford Motor Co.,
144 NJ. Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43 (1976), aff'd, 154 NJ. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805
(1977), cert. denied, 75 N.J. 616, 584 A.2d 846 (1978) (passenger in Army jeep
designed according to government specifications sued, contending that the jeep,
by not providing a roll bar or seatbelts, was designed defectively). Cf Dolphin
Garden, Inc. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824 (D. Conn. 1965) (contractor and
United States sued for dumping river soil on property adjoining plaintiff's land,
contractor arguing that it followed the direct instructions of the government).
Many of the cases during the period from 1964 to 1983 relied upon the govern-
ment specifications defense, not the government contractor defense; yet they are
basically the same. See Note, Liability of a Manufacturer, supra note 1, at 1055-64.
140 The Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol decision in the district court in 1982 marked
the first application of standards for the defense. See Koutsoubos v. Boeing
Vertol, Div. of Boeing Co., 533 F. Supp. 340, 340 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd, 755 F.2d
352 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821 (1985). Then, in 1983, the government
contractor defense began to play a major role in the ultimate decisions involving
military aircraft in various jurisdictions. See McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704
F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984) (Rockwell sued for
defective design of ejection seats);Johnston v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 351 (D.
Kan. 1983) (suit by employees against manufacturer alleging that defective mili-
tary aircraft instruments caused cancer or leukemia); Hubbs v. United Technolo-
gies, 574 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (plaintiffs alleged defective part caused crash
of Navy helicopter); McLaughlin v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 148 Cal. App. 3d 203, 195
Cal. Rptr. 764 (Ct. App. 1983).
"4 In 1964, the issue of control of the aircraft was a question of fact. Montgom-
ery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aft'd, 392
F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1968). Later decisions either expressly or impliedly developed
the defense as a matter of law. See O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 335 F. Supp. 1104
(E.D.N.Y. 1971) (plaintiff alleged defective design and negligent manufacture of
welded bulkhead in B-52 bomber). In later cases, the courts began to establish
policy considerations behind the rationale for the defense. See In re Agent Orange
Litig., 534 F. Supp. at 1046; In reAgent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at 762; Sanner, 144 N.J.
Super at 1, 364 A.2d at 43.
142 See Montgomey, 231 F. Supp. at 451.
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same circumstances, the courts ruled in favor of the de-
fendants as a matter of law, arguing that the plaintiffs
either failed to prove that the manufacturers were negli-
gent in their designing of the aircraft, 43 or that the air-
craft was completed in strict conformity to the required
standards outlined by the government.144 The courts also
granted verdicts as a matter of law when the plaintiffs
failed to prove that the alleged defect proximately caused
the crash. 45 In most instances, however, the key element
was knowledge 46 or whether the manufacturer or de-
signer knew or should have known that the military air-
craft was indeed defective at the time the aircraft was
designed. 47  The jurisdictions, however, disagreed as
to whether the United States could also be held liable if it
was the designer of the aircraft, 48 primarily because of
the courts' diverse interpretations of the discretionary
function exception of the FTCA. 49 As noted earlier, one
143 See O'Keefe, 335 F. Supp. at 1132; Kropp v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 329 F.
Supp. 477, 461 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); see also Ulmer v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
380 F. Supp. 549, 552 (5th Cir. 1967).
144 See Kropp, 329 F. Supp. at 463; Sanner, 144 N.J. Super at 3, 364 A.2d at 45.
145 See, e.g., Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 331 F. Supp. 257
(E.D. Mo. 1971), rev'd and remanded, 460 F.2d 631(8th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 485 F.2d
1288 (8th Cir. 1973) (claim of defect in design and negligence in manufacture of a
Navy F-4B aircraft).
146 See, e.g., Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961) (should
have known standard); O'Keefe, 335 F. Supp. at 1124 (manufacturers still have a
duty if they are not oblivious or aloof from the genesis of the design). Many
states, such as North Carolina, did not recognize the theory of strict tort liability,
and it was therefore essential to show some sort of knowledge to prevail. See
Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div. United Aircraft Corp., 425 F. Supp. 81, 89 (D.
Conn. 1977), aff'd on reconsideration, 505 F. Supp. 1049 (1981).
147 See OKeefe, 335 F. Supp. at 1132.
148 See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); Moyer v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 481 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1973).
149 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982). This section provides that the FTCA shall not
apply to:
any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Gov-
ernment, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regula-
tion, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or per-
form a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency
or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion
involved be abused.
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court held that the acceptance by the United States of de-
fective equipment, which was negligently designed or
constructed and posed a safety hazard to an individual op-
erating the aircraft, would fall short of immunizing the
United States from liability.' 50 Most other courts relied
upon the doctrine outlined in Feres v. United States '5 ' and
Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States,' 52 or what is
commonly known as the Feres-Stencel Doctrine,'5 3 to deter-
mine that the government was immune from suits in a
military aircraft disaster.
One fact was still consistent as it applied to military air-
craft. The right to sue the manufacturer existed if the
manufacturer was not required to follow strict guidelines
set forth by the government. 5 4 This principle, however,
began to change with the cases of Koutsoubos v. Boeing
Vertol, Division of Boeing Co. ,15- and McKay v. Rockwell Inter-
national Corp. 156
A. McKay v. Rockwell International Corp.
In McKay, two Navy pilots were killed in unrelated
Id. For the complete text of the statute on exceptions under the FTCA, see supra
note 42.
50 Moyer v. Martin, 481 F.2d at 598.
-1 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
52 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
,53 In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1055 (E.D.N.Y.
1982), aft'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984). The
Feres-Stencel doctrine bars actions against the government seeking direct or indi-
rect recovery for injuries arising in or out of the course of activity incident to
military service. Id. In Feres, the Supreme Court held that the United States was
immune from suit under the FTCA by a member of the armed services who was
injured or killed arising in or out of the course of activity incidental to military
service. 340 U.S. at 146. Stencel expanded this doctrine to exclude indemnity suits
from government contractors who might be required to pay damages to members
of the armed services injured incident to military service. 431 U.S. at 673. For an
in-depth discussion of the Feres-Stencel doctrine, see Note, From Feres to Stencel:
Should Military Personnel Have Access to FTCA Recovery?, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1099
(1977).
- Compare O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 335 F. Supp. 1104 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) with
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988).
'5 553 F. Supp. 340 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
-6 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
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crashes of RA-5C aircraft off the coast of Florida.157 Their
widows sued the manufacturers, alleging that both pilots'
ejection seats were designed defectively.15  Autopsies
supported the widow's argument that the ejection seats
probably caused the injuries sustained by the dece-
dents. 59 Consequently, the district court found for the
plaintiffs, stating that the manufacturer, Rockwell Interna-
tional Corp., had violated sections 388,160 389,161 and
402A 162 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed on all three sec-
157 Id. at 446.
158 Id.
159 Id.
-6 Id. at 453. Section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts deals with
chattels known to be dangerous for intended use:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for
another to use is subject to liability to those to whom the supplier
should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to
be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the
use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose
use it is supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be
dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is
supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous
condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
Id. at 454 n.13 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965)).
16, Id. at 453. Section 389 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts relates to chat-
tels unlikely to be made safe for use:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for
another's use, knowing or having reason to know that the chattel is
unlikely to be made reasonably safe before being put to a use which
the supplier should expect it to be put, is subject to liability for phys-
ical harm caused by such use to those whom the supplier should ex-
pect to use the chattel or to be endangered by its probable use, and
who are ignorant of the dangerous character of the chattel or whose
knowledge thereof does not make them contributorily negligent,
although the supplier has informed the other for whose use the chat-
tel is supplied of its dangerous character.
Id. at 455 n.16 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 389 (1965)).
162 Id. at 447. Section 402A states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
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tions,163 and determined that the Navy was aware of any
injuries that occurred while using the system and that the
Navy and Rockwell communicated continuously about the
system.16 As a result of this communication, the court
concluded that section 388 did not apply since the manu-
facturer had no duty to warn the Navy about the system's
dangerous condition.' 65 As noted in the opinion,
[t]o impose on Rockwell a duty to test for latent defects
would cause it to become a virtual guarantor of the proper
performance by the Navy of its duties. And neither the
text nor comments to section 388 indicate that there is a
duty under that section on the part of the supplier to with-
draw a product from the hands of the user, particularly
when that user is the Navy of the United States.' 6
6
Section 389 was also rejected, since the Navy continued
to use the system even after the accidents at issue, and the
Navy post-accident reports determined that the system
was reasonably safe. 167 The Ninth Circuit concluded by
stating that the court system should not interfere with the
Navy's evaluation of its weapons systems. 168
Although these holdings were significant, they were rec-
ognized as dicta, since the Ninth Circuit, at the time, did
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate consumer,
or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or en-
tered into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id. at 447 n.3 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)).
1- Id. at 446. The court stated that the Ninth Circuit had not yet adopted sec-
tion 388 and 389 of the Restatement as a basis for liability in Admiralty. However,
the court addressed the district court's decision with regard to these sections as
though it had adopted them. Id. at 453.
I- d. at 454.
I6 /d.
"m Id.
167 Id. at 455.
1- Id.
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not recognize sections 388 and 389 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. 169 However, the Ninth Circuit did rec-
ognize section 402A, and in its discussion of that section
the court outlined the elements necessary to establish im-
munity under the government contractor defense. 170 His-
torically, the court noted that the United States was
immune from suit by either soldiers or manufacturers
under the Feres-Stencel doctrine. 17  The rationale was that
if one allowed indemnity suits by manufacturers in the
same instances that the United States was immune from
the direct liability suits of injured servicemen, the courts
would be permitting plaintiffs to enter through back door
when they had been legislatively turned away at the front
door. 172
The Ninth Circuit further argued that allowing suits by
manufacturers in all instances would involve second-
guessing military orders and would put the judiciary in
the position of making military decisions.1 7 3 Thus, the
court concluded by holding that where
(1) the United States is immune from liability under Feres-
Stencel; (2) the supplier proves that the United States es-
tablished or approved reasonably precise specifications for
the allegedly defective equipment; (3) the equipment con-
formed to those specifications; and (4) the supplier
warned the United States about the patent errors in the
government specifications or about dangers involved in
the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier
but not to the United States, 74
then the manufacturer would also be immune from suit
,61 See supra note 163.
70 Id. at 447-51.
171 Id. at 448; see supra, note 153, for a discussion of the Feres-Stencel doctrine.
,72 Id. at 449. "To permit [petitioner] to proceed... here would be tojudically
admit at the back door that which has been legislatively turned away at the front
door. We do not believe that the [Federal Torts Claims] Act permits such a re-
sult." Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977)
(quoting Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 802 (1972)).
17. McKay, 704 F.2d at 449.
,74 Id. at 451.
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under the government contractor defense. 75
This was the first time that a circuit court standard for
the government contractor defense was outlined in the
context of a military aircraft disaster. 76 However, four
months prior to McKay, the court, in Koutsoubos, applied a
different standard to the government contractor defense.
B. Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol
In Koutsoubos, three Navy pilots were killed when their
helicopter crashed during a simulated rescue mission. 177
The plaintiffs subsequently filed suit alleging that the heli-
copter, manufactured by Boeing, was unsafe due to de-
sign defects 78 and was 'unsafe, unairworthy and
dangerously unfit for its intended use.' ,,179
Boeing, however, argued that it manufactured and sup-
plied the helicopter pursuant to a contract between the
Navy and Boeing and, therefore, summary judgment was
proper pursuant to the government contractor defense. 80
The district court, adopting the test set forth in In re Agent
Orange, noted that in order to shield a manufacturer from
liability in a case such as this one, the manufacturer would
have to meet three critical tests. First, they would have to
prove that the government established the design and
specific characteristics of the product.' 8' Second, there
would have to be a comparison between the government
specifications and the characteristics of the product. 8 2
The court acknowledged that "'[flailure of a defendant to
conform to the specifications would defeat the defense
only if the discrepancy between specifications and product
175 Id.
176 See infra notes 177-187 and accompanying text. Cf In re Agent Orange
Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1055 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145
(2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984) (applying the government con-
tractor defense standard in a non-military aircraft case).
17 553 F. Supp. at 341.
17m Koutsoubos, 755F.2d at 353.
179 Koutsoubos v. Boeing, 553 F. Supp. at 341 (quoting from the complaint).
18o Id.
l" Id. at 342.
182 Id.
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was a material one .... " ,,8'3 Finally, the defendant has to
have knowledge of such deficiencies, and the government
has to have equal or greater knowledge. 8 4 If all three
tests are met, then "the defendant can still be shielded
from liability as long as the product was produced 'pursu-
ant to and in compliance with the contract specifica-
tions.' "185 The court concluded that the first two
elements had been met 8 6 and the remaining issue was
whether or not the government had as much or greater
knowledge of the defect. 8 7
After judgment was entered on behalf of Boeing Vertol,
the plaintiffs appealed, alleging that the Navy did not es-
tablish the helicopter specification. 188 The plaintiffs
claimed that the specifications were established by both
the Navy and Boeing Vertol, through back-and-forth con-
versations.' 8 9  However, the Third Circuit affirmed the
judgment for the manufacturer and rejected the appel-
lants' argument, stating that there was sufficient govern-
ment participation to bring the case within the In re Agent
Orange rule. 90
The Koutsoubos and McKay holdings were substantial vic-
tories for the manufacturers of military equipment and se-
183 Id. (quoting In re Agent Orange Litig., 534 F. Supp. at 1057).
'1, Id. at 343.
185 Id.
"" Id. at 343-44. The court found sufficient evidence to establish the first ele-
ment of the defense in an affidavit submitted by Robert Tingley, senior contract
administrator for Boeing Vertol, and its supporting exhibits. Id. at 343. All that is
required, the court found, '"is for the defendant to prove that the product it sup-
plied was a particular product specified by the government.' " Id. (quoting In re
Agent Orange Litig., 534 F. Supp. at 1056).
The second element was also established using Tingley's affidavit which showed
that "the general and detail specifications were established by the Navy." Id. In
addition, the affidavit contained evidence that "the Navy established safety fea-
tures, testing requirements, emergency exit marking requirements, and interior
lighting requirements." Id. "In short," the affidavit read, "every feature of the
CH-46A, including the water landing and floatation capability and emergency
egress and lighting was tested and inspected to Navy requirements." Id.
,87 Id. at 344.
188 Koutsoubos, 755 F.2d at 354.
,m) Id.
ism Id. at 355.
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vere blows to plaintiffs who might seek to bring suit in an
area that was once readily available. Because of the de-
fense, defendant manufacturers did not feel compelled to
settle cases, as they once had.' 9 ' Consequently, Kout-
soubos' and McKay's effects were felt immediately. In 1983,
for example, the same year McKay was decided, several
military aviation manufacturers sought to employ the gov-
ernment contractor defense to escape liability for defec-
tively designed aircraft. However, these manufacturers
were only partially successful in obtaining their overall
objective. Even in McKay's and Koutsoubos' own jurisdic-
tions, the courts were reluctant to hold for the manufac-
turers of defective equipment, as a matter of law, under
the government contractor defense.
C. Other Military Aviation Cases Decided in 1983
In less than seven months after the McKay decision,
courts in three separate jurisdictions established the ap-
plicability of the defense. In Johnston v. United States,' 92
plaintiffs alleged that they contracted cancer as a result of
defective instrument dials used in military aircraft. 93 The
manufacturers sought summary judgment under the gov-
ernment contractor defense, arguing that the instruments
were produced under wartime contracts with the United
States. 94 Consequently, they could not be held liable for
a breach of an "ostensible but non-existent duty."' 95 To
support their argument, the defendants relied upon Mc-
Kay.' 96 Yet the argument was easily distinguished by the
,u This perception is implied primarily because of the dramatic increase in the
number of cases that were reported at the appellate and trial court levels over the
next five years. As discussed in this article, virtually all of these cases relied upon
the direct application of the government contractor defense, and most relied
upon McKay to establish their foundation. See infra text and accompanying notes
156-176.
192 568 F. Supp. 351 (D. Kan. 1983).
193 Id. at 353.
19 Id.
1U5 Id.
J 704 F.2d at 444. The Johnston court distinguished within the defendant's
argument two possible defenses: the contract specifications defense, based on or-
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district court stating:
When the product in question is a new and technically
complex one used only by the military - such as the ejec-
tion seat in McKay - the rationale has some force, but
when the product is a simple adaptation or copy of one
already sold in private commerce-as here-it does not. 19 7
Like the manufacturers in Johnston, the defendants in
Hubbs v. United Technologies '98 also sought to employ the
principles outlined in McKay and Koutsoubos. 99 Like John-
ston, they too were unsuccessful. 200 In Hubbs, three naval
reservists were killed when their SH-30 helicopter crashed
near Willow Grove Naval Air Station, Pennsylvania. 20 ' All
parties agreed that the crash was caused by a malfunction
in the cyclic pitch axis control system which controlled the
pitch or tilt of the helicopter.2 °2 The defendant relied
upon the government contractor defense, and stated that
it should not be held liable as a matter of law because the
helicopter was manufactured and supplied in strict ac-
cordance with applicable Navy contractual specifica-
tions.20 3 Ironically, the same district court that followed
the government contractor defense in Koutsoubos was not
comfortable enough to conclude, as a matter of law, that
the government either set specifications for the system or
approved final reasonably detailed specifications. 0 The
court further noted that although participation by the de-
fendant in the preparation of the specifications would not
defeat the government contractor defense, such evidence
could be relevant in determining the relative degrees of
knowledge as between the government and the defend-
dinary negligence principles, and the government contractor defense, which ap-
plies only where the product is manufactured under contract with the
government.Johnston, 568 F. Supp. at 353-355.
197 Id. at 357.
198 574 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
1- Id. at 98.
2o Id. at 100.
201 Id. at 97.
202 Id.
203 Id.
2-4 Id. at 99.
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ant.20 5  Nevertheless, the court still denied the defend-
ants' motion as being premature. 0 6
Manufacturers also had initial trouble in obtaining a di-
rected verdict in the jurisdiction in which McKay was de-
cided. In McLaughlin v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 0 7 the plaintiffs
appealed a special jury verdict for the manufacturer, alleg-
ing that the court improperly admitted evidence that Si-
korsky had complied with military specifications when it
designed the HH-3A combat and rescue helicopter. 20 8 Si-
korsky, on the other hand, argued that the trial court
erred when it did not allow use of the government con-
tractor defense as outlined in McKay. 20 9 The appellate
court determined that the defense outlined in McKay did
apply,2 10 and that the case should be bifurcated to deter-
mine immunity first.2 1'
Equally important, however, was the determination that
the district court erred when it allowed the jury to con-
sider the government specifications as even a factor in de-
termining whether or not the product was defective. 212
This additional holding seemed to be a limitation of Mc-
Kay, since the California court established that once the
20 i d. at 100.
206 Id.
207 148 Cal. App. 3d 203, 195 Cal. Rptr. 764 (Ct. App. 1983).
208 Id. at 208, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 766.
2- I at 210-111, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
210 Id. The plaintiffs attempted to argue that state law, not federal law, applied.
Id. Although this was a state court, the court rejected this argument and applied
federal law, holding,
"[t]o whatever extent state law may apply to govern the relations
between soldiers or others in the armed forces and persons outside
them or nonfederal governmental agencies, the scope, nature, legal
incidents and consequences of the relation between persons in ser-
vice and the Government are fundamentally derived from federal
sources and governed by federal authority. So also we think are in-
terferences with that relationship." Torts committed by a military
aircraft manufacturer against active duty military personnel is an ex-
ample of such "interferences" with the relationship between mem-
bers of the armed forces and the government. Therefore, a
substantial federal interest is at stake in this lawsuit.
Id. (citation omitted).
211 Id. at 212, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 768-69.
M12 Id. at 209, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 766-67.
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plaintiff proves an item is defective, the burden shifts to
the manufacturer to show that the benefits of the design
outweigh its inherent dangers. 1 3
Thus, although McKay and Koutsoubos were great moral
victories for the manufacturers of military aircraft, the
court's initial hesitancy to rule as a matter of law for the
manufacturers kept the victories rather limited. This be-
gan to change dramatically over, the next few years, as
each circuit court refined the government contractor de-
fense standards outlined by its predecessors and began to
interpret the defense in a manner consistent with how it
thought the defense should be applied.
D. Third Circuit Cases
The most active circuit court involved with military air-
craft disasters and the government contractor defense has
been the Third Circuit. As noted earlier, cases such as
Koutsoubos 214 and Hubbs215 helped to stimulate this activity.
They were, however, only the beginning. On September
11, 1982, a United States Army CH-47C "Chinook" heli-
copter crashed in Mannheim, West Germany.21 6 Suit was
brought, alleging that "[t]he crash was caused by the
blade to blade contact of the helicopter's tandem rotor
blades due to a failure of its synchronization system.1 21 7
In In re Mannheim,218 following a jury verdict in plaintiff's
favor, defendant Boeing Company moved for a judgment
n.o.v. based on the government contractor defense. 9
The federal district court denied the defendant's motion
and, relying upon Koutsoubos and Hubbs, held that the gov-
: Is d. at 208, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 766.
214 See supra notes 177-190 and accompanying text for a discussion of the deci-
sion in Koutsoubos.
215 See supra notes 198-205 and accompanying text for a discussion of the back-
ground and outcome of Hubbs.
2- In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim Ger. on Sept. 11, 1982, 586 F. Supp.
711 (E.D. Pa. 1984), rev'd, 769 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082
(1986).
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ernment contractor defense was unavailable to the de-
fendant.22 ' The court determined that the Army
submitted to Boeing only mission requirements and per-
formance specifications, while Boeing prepared the heli-
copter's specifications and drawings and had final control
over the design of the aircraft. 2 1
The court of appeals, however, reversed the lower
courts ruling and entered judgment on behalf of Boe-
ing.222 The Third Circuit emphasized the fact that the
Army had to approve any of Boeing's deviations from the
specifications 223 and that "the Army had inspected and
modified the prototype aircraft. ' 224 Thus, the Third Cir-
cuit held, under Pennsylvania law, "the government con-
tractor defense is available despite the contractor's
participation in the development of the design, since the
government has approved the design after substantial re-
view of the specifications. 225
The Third Circuit's ruling in In re Mannheim is critical
for two reasons. First, it marked one of the first times in
aviation cases that judgment was entered for the manufac-
turer as a matter of law under the government contractor
defense. 26 Second, the court applied not federal law but
Pennsylvania law, 227 since the aircraft was both manufac-
220 Id. at 716-18. The court noted, as elements from Hubbs necessary to the
government contractor defense, that the government had established the specifi-
cations for the helicopter, that the helicopter, as manufactured, met the govern-
ment's specifications in all material aspects, and that the government knew as
much as or more than the defendant about the hazards to people that accompa-
nied use of the helicopter. Id. at 717.
In addition, this case materially differed from Koutsoubos, where it was shown
that the Navy established both general and detailed specifications, in that here the
government did not establish the specifications for the CH-47 helicopter. Id.; see
Turner & Sutin, supra note 23, at 412-13.
221 In re Mannheim Air Crash, 586 F. Supp. at 717.
222 In re Mannheim, 769 F.2d at 125.
225 Id. at 123.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 122-23.
226 See id. at 125.
227 Id. at 120 n.7; see also In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim Ger. on Sept. 11,
1982, 575 F. Supp. 521, 527 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (memorandum and opinion order
established that Pennsylania law, rather than German law, would apply).
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tured and assembled in Pennsylvania. 228 Both points were
equally important in three other Third Circuit cases 229 in-
volving Boeing Vertol, where judgment as a matter of law
was entered in Boeing's favor under the government con-
tractor defense.
In Powell v. Boeing Vertol Co.,23° the same district court
called upon to rule in In re Mannheim faced a similar scena-
rio when a Marine Corps CH-46 helicopter crashed off the
coast of Hawaii. 23 1 The plaintiff sued, alleging that the
"lack of an aural warning device on the helicopter's two
radar altimeters, which altimeters provide visual indica-
tion of the helicopter's height above the ocean surface,"
was the proximate cause of the accident.23 2 The court ap-
plied the standards outlined in Koutsoubos2 "3 and In re
Mannheim 234 and determined that, under the terms of the
contract, Boeing was not required to install radar altime-
ters that did not have aural warning devices.235 No devia-
tion was allowed unless reviewed and approved by the
Navy.236 The court also noted that Boeing met all the re-
quirements and detailed specifications of the contract 23 7
and that the Navy knew just as much or more about the
dangers of the altimeter Boeing had installed.23 8 In fact,
the Navy conducted its own investigations into eight acci-
dents involving CH-46 aircraft between 1969 and 1982
but did not allow Boeing to participate. 9 In holding for
Boeing, the court noted that
228 In re Mannheim, 769 F.2d at 117-18.
229 Wilson v. Boeing Co., 655 F. Supp. 766 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Powell v. Boeing
Vertol Co., No. 84-5503, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 1986) (1986 Westlaw
13840); Humphreys v. Boeing Co., No. 85-4524, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Pa. July 17,
1986) (1986 Westlaw 8129).
23o No. 84-5503, slip op. at I (E.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 1986) (1986 Westlaw 13840).
211 Id. at 1-2.
232 Id.
23, Id. at 2 (applying Koutsoubos, 755 F.2d at 354-55).
2.1 Id. (applying In re Mannheim, 769 F.2d at 121).
3 Id. at 7.
23,i Id. at 3-4.
21 Id. at 11.
Id. at 5-6.
2 Id. at 6.
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limiting inquiry into relative knowledge to the time of de-
sign would subvert the third element's purpose of encour-
aging contractors to warn the government of unknown
hazards so that development and procurement decisions
will be fully informed. It would remove any incentive for
government contractors to propose modification of defec-
tively designed products based upon product
performance.24 °
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania also ruled in favor
of Boeing in Humphreys v. Boeing Co. 241 and Wilson v. Boeing
Co. 242 In Humphreys, the plaintiff brought suit for injuries
he sustained while a passenger in an Army CH-47B Chi-
nook helicopter. 43 The plaintiff sought damages as the
result of Boeing's design of a defective rotor blade which
hit a gully several times and ultimately struck the plaintiff
while he was in the cabin.244 Both parties agreed that
Boeing had met the first two parts of the Third Circuit's
standard2 4 - and that the only issue in dispute was whether
or not Boeing had more knowledge of the hazards in the
aft gear slope landings than the Army.246
In holding for the defendants, the court recognized that
the Army helicopter crews received special training in aft-
gear slope landings and were taught by. the Army the
hazards involved and the standard operating procedures
used to minimize the risk. 47 The court reasoned that "[i]t
is utterly inconceivable that Boeing could know more
about the hazards involved in aft gear slope landings than
the Army, which had developed the maneuver and the
highly detailed procedures to accomplish it in a safe
manner."248
240 Id.
24, No. 85-4524, slip op. at 1.
242 655 F. Supp. 766 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
243 No. 85-4524, slip op. at 1.
244 Id. at 2.
24 Id.
2441 Id.
247 Id. at 3.
248 Id.
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In Wilson,2 4 9 the court relied upon principles echoed in
In re Mannheim, Powell, and Humphreys to arrive at its ulti-
mate conclusion.2 50 The decedent, Larry Joe Wilson, was
killed aboard a Navy CH-46D helicopter.2 5 ' His family al-
leged that his death resulted from a defectively-designed
lubrication system.2 52 In holding in favor of Boeing, the
court demonstrated the liberalization of the government
contractor defense by distinguishing In re Agent Orange and
emphasizing manufacturer compliance with a specification
approved or established by the government. 53
This 1987 interpretation displayed the Third Circuit's
reluctance to allow military aviator cases to go to a jury.
From 1982 to 1987, the standard of immunity expanded
to cover a wide range of manufacturers. In Koutsoubos ,254
for example, the court emphasized the importance of con-
tinuous back-and-forth discussion between the manufac-
turer and the government.255 The court in Powell,256
however, did not find it necessary to show that the gov-
ernment established or approved the specifications with
knowledge of their dangerous characteristics.257 In Wil-
son, the defendant satisfied the first element of the govern-
ment contractor defense so long as the government
established or approved the specifications.58 Continuous
back-and-forth negotiations were no longer necessary.25
2.9 655 F. Supp. at 766.
251) Id. at 772.
s,5 Id. at 768.
252 Id. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the system lacked a warning de-
vice, mechanism, or indicator which would enable the crew to determine that the
engine's oil filter was about to, or had become, clogged to the point where the oil
flow would bypass the filter and enter the system through a bypass valve. Id. If
the oil enters the engine in an unfiltered condition and contains potential con-
taminants, loss of the oil function system could result. Id.
253 Id. at 773.
2 - 755 F.2d at 352.
25- Id. at 355.
256 Powell, No. 84-5503, slip op.
257 Id. at 10; see also Wilson, 655 F. Supp. at 772-73.
258 655 F. Supp. at 773.
2 5 Id. The court stated:
Plaintiffs interpret the first prong of the In re Agent Orange Litigation
test as requiring the contractor to show that there were continuous
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Thus, the Third Circuit appears to take a very liberal ap-
proach to the government contractor defense. An equally
liberal approach appears in Fourth Circuit opinions.
E. Fourth Circuit Decisionw
On May 27, 1986, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
decided three unrelated military aircraft disaster cases
and held for the manufacturer pursuant to its interpreta-
tion of the government contractor defense established on
that date in Tozer v. LTV Corp..26° In Tozer, the plaintiffs
alleged that when the "Buick Hood" panel 261 came off of
the decedent's Navy RF-8G airplane, the decedent lost
control, causing the plane to crash.262 The defendants
used the government contractor defense to deny liability
since the Navy had approved the installation of the
panel.2 63  The district court found for the defendants,
stating that, under the standard of strict liability, the de-
fendants were immune as a matter of law.264 The court,
however, permitted the jury to determine the defendants'
liability under a negligence standard.2 65 The jury found
that the defendants negligently designed the Buick Hood
modification and ultimately found in favor of the
plaintiffs .266
back and forth discussions or negotiations regarding the inclusion or
exclusion of the specific design deficiency alleged in this case. This
Court rejects plaintiffs' interpretation of the first prong of the gov-
ernment contractor defense. This is not the formulation of the de-
fense adopted by the Third Circuit in Koutsoubos. It is sufficient for
the contractor to show, as was done here, that the overall detailed
specification was established or approved by the government.
Id. (referring to three-part test under In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F.
Supp. 1046, 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1067 (1984).
2- 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988).
261 Id. at 404. The Buick Hood, as described by the court, is a hinged panel on
the aircraft that permits access to the equipment underneath for repair and main-
tenance. The court noted that the panel should not open during flight. Id.
262 Id.
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On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed and entered
judgment for LTV.267 In an artfully written opinion, the
court emphasized that under the separation of powers
doctrine, courts should not involve themselves in sophisti-
cated military matters.268 Consequently, since the district
court had neither the constitutional power nor the exper-
tise necessary to make decisions for the military, the jury
also lacked these powers. 269 As stated by the Fourth
Circuit,
tlhe fact that the challenge here does not involve Tozer's
immediate commanding officer or relate to matters of per-
sonal discipline is irrelevant. Military contractors ordina-
rily work so closely with the military . . . that it is nearly
impossible to contend that the contractor defectively
designed a piece of equipment without actively criticizing
a military decision. Civilian scrutiny of such decisions is
generally exerted through executive and legislative over-
sight on behalf of the public at large, not, as here, through
the judiciary at the behest of an individual serviceman. 70
The court thus determined that the standards outlined
in McKay271 would apply not only to cases of strict liability
but also in negligence and breach of warranty claims, 272 so
long as government involvement consisted of more than a
mere rubber stamp of approval. 73 The opinion in Tozer,
like Wilson, was even more liberal than that of In re Mann-
heim. In re Mannheim emphasized that there must be sub-
stantial review of the specifications by the military in
order for the government contractor defense to be avail-
able.274 Tozer, however, only mandated genuine participa-
tion in the design.275 Thus, the Third Circuit's shift in
267 Id. at 409.
2- Id. at 405.
26- Id. at 405-06.
270 Id. at 406.
2 1 See supra notes 164-176 and accompanying text for a discussion of the McKay
standard for the government contractor defense in military aircraft accidents.
272 Id. at 408.
273 Id. at 407-08 (quoting In re Mannheim, 769 F.2d at 122).
274 769 F.2d at 123-24.
275 792 F.2d at 408.
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standards affected the Fourth Circuit as well.
This Fourth Cirucit shift was more evident in two cases
decided on the same day as Tozer, namely Dowd v. Textron,
Inc. 2 7 6 and Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.277 Boyle, dis-
cussed later in detail,278 involved a Marine Corps helicop-
ter that crashed off the coast of Virginia Beach,
Virginia.279  Four crew members survived the impact,
three of whom escaped through emergency exits. 280 The
co-pilot, David Boyle, did not escape and drowned.28'
The plaintiffs alleged that Sikorsky defectively repaired
the pilot valve of the helicopter's servo and designed the
escape hatch defectively, since it opened outward instead
of inward.28 2 In applying the standards outlined in McKay
and Tozer, the court concluded that Sikorsky built the heli-
copter, and the Navy accepted it as complying with specifi-
cations.283 The court noted:
The Navy thus had thirteen years of experience with this
particular helicopter at the time of Boyle's crash. Plaintiffs
point to nothing in the record that indicates there were
any hazards of which Sikorsky was aware and the Navy was
not. 'Sikorsky's duty to warn the Navy of any hazards
known to it but not to the Navy was thus not brought into
question.284
Like the court in Boyle, the district court in Dowd v. Tex-
tron, Inc. also gave the appropriate instructions for strict
liability; however, the court gave erroneous instructions
27(; 792 F.2d 409 (4th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988).
277 792 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988).
278 See infra notes 371-386 for a discussion of the applicability of federal law in
military aircraft disasters, the recognition of the government contractor defense,
and the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Boyle.
279 792 F.2d at 414.
280 Id.
281 Id.
'182 Id. The court pointed out that, "the helicopter servo acts as a sort of power
steering to assist the pilot in flying the plane. After the accident, a small chip of
wire was found in the pilot valve. Plaintiffs argued that the chip caused the servo
to stop functioning, the pilot lost control of the helicopter, and the helicopter
crashed into the water." Id.
28s Id. at 415.
284 Id.
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on the negligence claims. 285 In Dowd, the pilot and co-
pilot were killed when their helicopter began "mast
bumping ' 286 and "the blades cut through the cockpit of
the helicopter. '287 The Army knew about the problems
with the rotor system but had failed to make the three
changes suggested by the contractor.2 88 The court, there-
fore, concluded that upholding a verdict against the con-
tractor would impose "liability without responsibility"
and reversed the district court's decision.289
The three decisions of May 27, 1986, had a dramatic
effect on the district courts of the Fourth Circuit in cases
involving strict liability, breach of warranty, and negli-
gence claims. 290 The circuit court, however, had not ad-
dressed the issues of a duty to warn and what happens
when suit is brought not by a member of the military but
by a civilian who is injured in a military aircraft. 29' These
two issues were handled by the District.Court of Maryland
in Ramey v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co. 2 92
In Ramey, the plaintiff, an aircraft mechanic, was seri-
ously injured while trying to remove an ejection seat from
a Navy F-18 aircraft. 293 He alleged that Martin-Baker had
designed a defective "trip rod, firing lever, and sears com-
ponent of the ejection seat. ' ' 29 4 The court, in granting
summary judgment on the basis of the government con-
tractor defense, determined that plaintiff's status as a ci-
285 Id. at 411.
286 Id. at 410. According to the court, "tihe rotor [the system of rotating
blades] is attached to a rotating mast. If the rotor dips at an extreme angle and the
mast remains stationary, the hub of the rotor may strike the mast and sever it." Id.
This is known as "mast bumping". Id. The court further noted that "[w]hen mast
bumping occurs in flight, it is generally catastrophic because the rotor separates
from the mast, and the helicopter can no longer fly." Id.
287 Id.
288 Id. at 412. Bell made three suggestions to the Army that it believed might
alleviate the mast bumping problem: installation of "a hub spring, a mast plug,
and a four-bladed rotor system." Id. at 411-12.
289 Id. at 412.
2-0 See supra notes 260-289 and accompanying text.
291 Id.
292 656 F. Supp. 984 (D. Md. 1987).
293 Id. at 985.
294 Id. at 987.
483
484 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [54
vilian did not matter because the defense went to the
machinery and not to the individual.295 Yet the court de-
nied, without prejudice,296 summary judgment on the
duty to warn.297 Relying on McKay 298 and In Re Agent Or-
ange,299 the court determined that the defendants did not
have enough facts to support a summary judgment on the
duty to warn... but acknowledged that the denial was
probably a mere formality, stating:
Although this claim may not be a repetition of the alleged
design defect concerning the seat's potential to inadver-
tently discharge, it too may be viewed as a type of design
defect under the theory that warnings in general are safety
components of the product, the existence of which are dic-
tated by the specifications established or approved by the
Navy. Under this theory a manufacturer should be given
the same protection from liability for defects in verbal
safeguards as it is for defects in physical safeguards.30 '
On this basis, the district court allowed the defendants an
opportunity to renew their motion at a later date. 0 2
These recent Third and Fourth Circuit cases illustrate
that the government contractor defense outlined in Mc-
Kay and Koutsoubos was welcomed and accepted by these
circuits with little or no deviation. Yet one circuit did not
buy into either of these arguments. 0 3 Rather, the Elev-
enth Circuit relied not so much on the majority's opinion
295 Id. at 987, 990; see also In re Air Crash Diasaster at Mannheim Ger. on Sept.
11, 1982, 586 F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Pa. 1984), rev'd, 769 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986) (government contractor defense not applicable to a
manufacturer who had final control over the design of the helicopter); Casabianca
v. Casabianca, 104 Misc. 2d 348, 428 N.Y.S. 2d 400 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (manufac-
turer's compliance with Army specifications was a complete defense).
296 Ramey, 656 F. Supp. at 1000. The court did, however, determine that this
motion could be renewed once the defendants believed that they had enough facts
to support it. Id.
297 Id. at 995-87, 1000.
29s 704 F.2d at 444.
2- 534 F. Supp. at 1046.
- Ramey, 656 F. Supp. at 999-1000.
3o, Id. at 999.
302 Id. at 1000.
303 See Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736 (11 th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988).
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but upon the dissent's argument in McKay to help deter-
mine its own version of the government contractor
defense.304
F. Eleventh Circuit Decision
The Eleventh Circuit, unlike any other circuit, devel-
oped a very unique interpretation of the government con-
tractor defense in Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.303 In
Shaw, the decedent's Navy Grumman A-6 aircraft crashed
into the Pacific Ocean immediately after launch by cata-
pult from the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Constellation.0 6 The
plaintiff's evidence established that the crash was proba-
bly caused by the loss or failure of a bolt in the "stabilizer
actuation system" or "longitudinal flight control sys-
tem. ' 30 7 The defendants alleged that the government
contractor defense shielded them from liability.30 8 The
district court disagreed.0 9 In applying a strict interpreta-
tion of the McKay elements, the district court found that
the defendants failed to meet the four essential demands
and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.31 0
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower
court's ruling, yet overturned the trial court's application
of McKay .3 1 First, the court rejected the policy rationale
for the defense after determining that the reasoning in
McKay was "weak support for the government contractor
defense. '3 1 2 Second, the court further reasoned that Mc-
Kay's interpretation of the Feres-Stencel doctrine was
"strained" and "outdated. ' 3 1 3
'o Id. at 736.
3o5 778 F.2d 736 (1 lth Cir. 1985), aff'g 593 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D. Fla. 1984), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988).
3- Shaw v. Grumman, 593 F. Supp. at 1067.
307 Shaw v. Grumman, 593 F. Supp. at 1068-69; Shaw, 778 F.2d at 738.
so8 Shaw v. Grumman, 593 F. Supp. at 1073.
3-9 Id. at 1074.
s5o Shaw, 778 F.2d at 738.
311 Id.
312 Id. at 741.
313 Id. at 742. The Eleventh Circuit specifically rejected the McKay argument
that military contractor liability for defective military equipment would increase
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Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit's approach to the
government contractor defense was unique. The court
rationalized that although the separation of powers doc-
trine compelled the judiciary to defer to military decisions
involving the design of military or weapon systems,' 1 4 the
government contractor defense would have only limited
application. Under the Shaw test, a contractor may escape
liability only if it affirmatively proves its compliance with
certain conditions.3 5 The Shaw interpretation is similar to
that of other circuits, in that it explicitly rejects a "rubber
stamp approval", and requires authorization to be "know-
ing." Yet the burden placed on the manufacturer is much
more severe under the Shaw test since the court also re-
quired approval by the military to be "clear - that is, ob-
viously related and responsive" - in order to proceed
with the dangerous design. 6
G. Other District Court Decisions
Although the Eleventh Circuit rejected the McKay inter-
pretation of the government contractor defense, the court
in Hendrix v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc.3 ' 7 accepted McKay
and granted summary judgment in favor of the manufac-
the contractor's cost to cover its liability, and that these increased costs would be
passed on to the government. Id. at 741-42. "To the extent that any competition
obtains in the market for defense products .... contractors with defective designs
may be deterred from passing through the cost of liability for defective design by
competition from contractors with better safety recrods." Id..at 742 (footnotes
omitted). The Shaw court relied upon the decision of United States v. Shearer,
432 U.S. 52 (1985), to hold that "the limitation of government liability rationale
behind the Feres Stencel doctrine appears . . . to be 'no longer controlling.'" Id.
(quoting Shearer).
3I Id. at 743.
31- Id. at 746. The conditions are:
(1) [the contractor] did not participate, or participated only mini-
mally, in the design of those products or parts of products shown to
be defective; or (2) [the contractor] timely warned the military of the
risks of the design and notified it of alternative designs reasonably
known by the contractor, and that the military, although forewarned,




317 634 F. Supp. 1551 (N.D. Tex. 1986).
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turer3 t In Hendrix, the plaintiffs alleged that James R.
Hendrix, Jr.'s Army helicopter crashed as the result of a
failed lever pivot bolt in the scissors and sleeve assem-
bly. 3 19 Because "any deviation from the approved design
specifications had . . . [to be] approved by the Army,13 20
Bell maintained that it was not liable to the plaintiff's
under the government contractor defense.3 21 Bell further
argued that it had "no duty as a military contractor to
warn or notify the government of possible product
changes or improvements which might make the product
safer after the product had been delivered and accepted
by the government. ' 322 The court agreed with Bell, hold-
ing not only that the McKay elements had been met,32 3 but
also that Bell indeed had no duty to warn the Army of
post-delivery product changes, since Bell had no central
control over the helicopter after it was accepted by the
government.324
Unlike any other case previously mentioned, manufac-
turers in the case of Estate of Portnoy v. Cessna Aircraft Co. 325
used the government contractor defense not to gain a
summary judgment motion, but rather to oppose a mo-
tion for partial summary judgment against them.326 In
Estate of Portnoy, a military 02-A airplane crashed, killing
Major John T. Baggs and Sergeant David L. Portnoy.32 7
The plaintiffs alleged that the propeller was designed de-
Id. at 1558.
I,' d. at 1552. An army accident report indicated that the bolt failure caused
the main rotor blade to become uncontrollable, subjecting the helicopter to aero-
dynamic forces which separated the main rotor system from the aircraft, resulting
in the helicopter crashing to the ground. Id.
-2 Id. at 1553.
321 Id. at 1555.
322 Id.
$23 Id. at 1556-57; see supra note 174 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the four elements of the government contractors defense in McKay.
24 Hendrix, 634 F. Supp. at 1557.
325 612 F. Supp. 1147 (S.D. Miss. 1985).
'21 Id. at 1152.
3 7 Id. at 1149. Major Baggs was the assigned pilot of the flight but an advisor
to Cessna who investigated the crash concluded, "Sergeant Portnoy was in control
of the airplane at the time that it crashed." Id.
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fectively,3 28 and contended that a motion for partial sum-
mary judgment was appropriate since the defendants were
found strictly liable for the same defect in an earlier un-
published decision.3 29 The district court noted that offen-
sive collateral estoppel was viewed with "stricter scrutiny"
than defensive collateral estoppel, 330 and that the plain-
tiffs could not "ride on the coat tails' ' 33 1 of the Baggs case
if they could have joined as plaintiffs in the first action. 32
More importantly, at the time of the Baggs decision, the
Texas courts had not recognized the government contrac-
tor defense.33 Therefore, the court held that
this issue, which bars Cessna from liability, has never been
actually litigated and determined adversely to Cessna in
the prior litigation. Since the general contractor defense
has been recently applied in Federal District Court in Mis-
sissippi, it would constitute an unfairness and injustice to
the defendant if this Court were to permit the use of offen-
sive collateral estoppel and deny Cessna its day in
Court. 3 4
The direct effect of the development of the government
contractor defense was of substantial magnitude. How-
ever, the indirect effect was also noticed in jurisdictions
that were once staunch advocates of the plaintiffs right to
sue. In the case of Resnick v. Sikorsky Aircraft,3 5 the District
Court of Connecticut confronted virtually the identical
fact situation that it faced years earlier in Quadrini v. Sikor-
sky Aircraft Division.3 6 Yet the court ruled differently in
328 Id.
329 Id. (citing Nancy Baggs Germone v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. 3-78-1193-G
(N.D. Tex. June 8, 1981)). Major Baggs' wife agreed to a settlement and final
judgment that did not reach the issue of the liability of the defendant, Cessna. Id.
33o Id. at 1150.





" 660 F. Supp. 415 (D. Conn. 1987).
336 Quadrini, 425 F. Supp. at 81; see supra notes 107-119 for a discussion of re-
covery on a wrongful death claim, jurisdiction of a federal question, and conflict
of laws regarding contracts and torts.
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each case.
In Resnick, the defendants moved to dismiss a wrongful
death action which sought damages under negligence,
strict liability, breach of warranty, and breach of con-
tract.3 " The district court, like the court in Quadrini, de-
termined that North Carolina law governed the tort issues
and that Connecticut law governed the contractual
claims.3 a Unlike Quadrini, however, the breach of con-
tract claim was dismissed since the plaintiffs failed to al-
lege that they had privity or knowledge of the contractual
relationship between Sikorsky and the purchaser of the
helicopter. 339 The court reasoned that this dismissal of
the contract claim was appropriate because the plaintiffs
were left with a viable remedy based upon a negligence
claim under North Carolina law.3 40 The court also dis-
missed the claims of strict liability and tortious breach of
warranty, since these claims were not actionable under
North Carolina law.341
This ruling was of great significance, since the strong
public policy echoed by the Connecticut court just ten
years prior to Resnick3 4 2 evaporated completely. The
Connecticut court no longer felt obliged to hold parties,
who made representations in Connecticut, legally respon-
sible. 3 Consequently, even Connecticut was no longer a
safe haven for plaintiffs.
Like Resnick, the court in Church v. Martin-Baker Aircraft
Co.344 also ruled in favor of the manufacturer. But the
Church court purposely avoided ruling on the government
contractor defense, and determined instead that the plain-
tiffs failed to establish the proximate cause of the acci-
3.7 Resnick, 660 F. Supp. at 416.
-, Id. at 417-18.
-9 Id. at 418.
340 Id.
341 Id.
542 See supra note 118 and accompanying text for a discussion of the court's
holding in Quadrini regarding the social and economic policy of Connecticut's
contract law.
33 Resnick, 660 F. Supp. at 418.
$44 643 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Mo. 1986).
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dent 45 In Church, the plaintiffs alleged that Air Force
Captain Stephan P. Church received fatal injuries when he
ejected from a defective ejection seat while flying over the
Gulf of Mexico. 4 6 The defendant, however, asserted that
even if the seat was in fact defective, Martin-Baker was im-
mune from suit pursuant to the government contractor
defense.347 In avoiding the government contractor de-
fense, the court noted that the
[d]efendant in summary proceedings, which were taken
with the case, and at trial, urged the Court to find that it
had no obligation to plaintiff because of the "government
contractor defense." This defense in some circuits has
been upheld by immunizing contractors from liability in-
curred during the performance of government contracts.
As judgment is to be entered for defendant on the merits,
it is unnecessary to consider the government contractor
defense issue.348
IV. INITIAL POLICY DIFFICULTIES OF THE DEFENSE PRIOR
TO JUNE 27, 1988
Since 1982, the development of the elements necessary
to establish the government contractor defense has been
far more dramatic and more explicit than the somewhat
confusing rationales developed over the twenty-five year
period preceding the district court opinion in Kout-
soubos.349 But, because the defense was still in the neona-
tal stage of development, there were still several
questions that remained unsolved. One of the most criti-
cal questions was whether state or federal law should gov-
.45 Id. at 509.
4 6 Id. at 501.
347 Id.
34 Id. at 509.
349 See supra notes 177-187 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ele-
ments of the government contractor defense set forth in Koutsoubos, which in-
cluded:, (1) proof that the government established the design and specific
characteristics of the product; (2) a comparison between the government specifi-
cations and the characteristics of the product; and (3) defendant's knowledge of
the deficiencies coupled with the government's equal or greater knowledge.
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ern in a military aircraft disaster.3 5 0 McLaughlin touched
upon this issue,3 5 1 and there the court stated that federal
law, not state law, should apply. 52 The significance of
this court's decision was minimal since very few courts re-
lied upon its decision. 5 3 Most courts did not feel com-
pelled to deal with this issue, primarily because a large
number of cases were brought under the Death on the
High Seas Act3 54 and, consequently, the courts deter-
mined that federal law would govern. 55 This was a ques-
tion of substantial importance, however, since many state
courts did not recognize the government contractor de-
fense. 56 Thus, the determination of the federal or state
law issue was virtually inevitable, since it would be this
issue that would ultimately decide how entrenched the
government contractor defense would become in the legal
system.
Another policy problem that developed for the defense
was whether to apply the law of the jurisdiction where the
accident occurred,3 57 the law of where the contract was
completed, 5 8 or the law of the jurisdiction with the most
significant contacts.3 5 9 Courts applied all of these reme-
dies, and some courts even combined the laws of several
jurisdictions to obtain an answer.3 60  These different
choice-of-law concepts again made it incredibly difficult
for courts to determine a rather uniform government con-
150 See Note, Government Contract Defense, supra note 1, at 181.
35, McLaughlin, 148 Cal. App. 3d at 211-12, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 768-69.
352 Id. at 211, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
353 See supra note 227 and accompanying text for the Third Circuit's holding
that Pennsylvania law would apply.
-14 See Tozer, 792 F.2d at 404; Koutsoubos, 755 F.2d at 353; Shaw, 778 F.2d at 738;
Wilson, 655 F. Supp. at 768; Church, 643 F. Supp. at 501.
!5 See Tozer, 792 F.2d at 404; Koutsoubos, 755 F.2d at 353; Shaw, 778 F.2d at 737;
Wilson, 655 F. Supp. at 767; Church, 643 F. Supp. at 500.
3- See infra notes 371-381 and accompanying text for a discussion of the appli-
cabilty of federal law to military aircraft disasters.
37 See Ramey, 656 F. Supp. at 984; Hubbs, 575 F.Supp. at 96.
8 See Wilson, 655 F. Supp. at 766; Powell, No. 84-5503, slip op.; Humphreys, No.
85-4524, slip op.
359 See In re Mannheim Air Crash, 586 F. Supp. at 711.
3- See Resnick, 660 F. Supp. at 415; Quadrini, 425 F. Supp. at 81.
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tractor defense policy.36" '
Finally, the third and most obvious problem with the
defense was the different standards that each court ap-
plied. For example, under the government participation
element, 362 some circuits held that all the manufacturer
must show was government-approved specifications,3 63
while others held that there had to be continuous back-
and-forth conversations between the government and the
manufacturer. 3 64 The Eleventh Circuit stated that, in or-
der for the manufacturer to escape liability, the govern-
ment must have compelled him to make the defective
product to specifications. 65 All of these factors posed an
equal protection problem, since, under the Death and
High Seas Act, some plaintiffs were permitted to re-
cover 366 while others were dismissed before trial 367 or af-
ter a verdict was rendered. 68 Most of these cases were
under virtually identical fact situations or scenarios,
namely, that the government wanted to enhance a part of
36, By differing over the choice-of-law issue, the courts created tremendous dif-
ficultly in establishing uniformity since no manufacturer is precisely sure which
law will govern claims against it. In this pot-luck scenario, the choice of law will
depend a great deal on where the aircraft crashes.
36. Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, Div. of Boeing Co., 755 F.2d 352, 353 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821 (1985). This government participation element was
the first prong under Koutsoubos, which required that "the government establish
the specifications for the helicopter." Id. at 354. Under Tozer, this element was
the second prong and required that the United States approved reasonably pre-
cise specifications for the equipment and the equipment conformed to those spec-
ifications. 792 F.2d at 404-07; see also Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778
F.2d 736, 745-46 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988).
36- See Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 407-08 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988); Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d 413, 414
(4th Cir. 1986), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988); see also Wilson v. Boeing Co., 655
F. Supp. 766, 773 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
Koutsoubos, 755 F.2d at 355; In re Mannheim Air Crash, 586 F. Supp. at 717.
365 See Shaw, 778 F.2d at 746.
Id. at 737.
367 See Wilson, 655 F. Supp. at 766; Powell v. Boeing Vertol Co., No. 84-5503,
slip op. at 1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 1986) (1986 Westlaw 13840); Humphreys v. Boeing
Co., No. 85-4524, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Pa. July 17, 1986) (1986 Westlaw 8129).
31, Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
2897 (1988); Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1986),
vacated, 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988); Dowd v. Textron, Inc., 792 F.2d 409 (4th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988).
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the machinery, and, therefore, the manufacturer designed
the enhancement. Even in defective military aircraft cases
which didn't involve the government contractor defense,
the courts in Quadrini3 6 9 and Resnick 370 established two
different outcomes in virtually the same fact pattern.
Thus, like the earlier defective military aircraft cases, the
cases involving the modern-day government contractor
defense lacked one major thing - uniformity in their ap-
plication of the defense.
V. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION OF BOYLE V. UNITED
TECHNOLOGIES CORP.
On June 27, 1988, the Supreme Court sought to elimi-
nate this lack of uniformity through its decision in Boyle v.
United Technologies Corp.371 Unfortunately, like its prede-
cessors, the Court also had an extremely difficult time de-
termining how the standard was to be applied, given that
the case was argued in October 1987 and reargued in
April 1988.372 One journal rationalized that the reargu-
ment became necessary when the Court deadlocked in a
preliminary vote, and, therefore, that Supreme Court Jus-
tice Anthony Kennedy was needed to cast the
tiebreaker.7 3
In Boyle,3 74 the Supreme Court was called upon to de-
termine whether state or federal law applied in military
aircraft disasters 375 and whether or not the government
369 See supra notes 107-119 and accompanying text for a discussion of Quadrini
in which the court, relying on North Carolina tort law, dismissed a strict liability
claim but let a breach of contract claim remain where two Marines were killed in
their helicopter which was manufactured by the defendant and sold to the United
States.
370 See supra notes 335-342 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of
Resnick in which the court, under circumstances similar to Quadnni, dismissed the
contract claim since the plaintiffs failed to allege that they were not privy to the
relationship between the Sikorsky and the purchaser of the helicopter.
371 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988).
372 Id.
373 Repa, Supreme Court Preview, 74 A.B.A. J. 48 (May 1988).
374 See infra notes 277-284 and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts
presented in the Boyle case.
375 108 S. Ct. at 2513.
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contractor defense was a defense that the Court should
recognize.3 76 In a 5-to-4 decision, Justice Scalia, in writ-
ing the opinion for the majority, determined that
although the Court has, in most instances, refused to pre-
empt state law in the absence of either a clear statutory
prescription or direct conflict of federal law, there are
some interests that are so "uniquely federal" that they are
governed exclusively by federal law. 7  In determining
that contracts between the government and the manufac-
turer of military equipment fall under that unique federal
interest, the Court held that
[t]he imposition of liability on Government contractors
will directly affect the terms of Government contracts:
either the contractor will decline to manufacture the de-
sign specified by the Government, or it will raise its price.
Either way, the interests of the United States will be di-
rectly affected. 78
The Court then rationalized that the discretionary func-
tion of the FTCA3 79 sought to protect manufacturers of
military equipment and, therefore, determined that the
standard of immunity outlined by the Eleventh Circuit
was erroneous:
While this formulation may represent a perfectly reason-
able tort rule, it is not a rule designed to protect the fed-
eral interest embodied in the "discretionary function"
exemption. The design ultimately selected may well re-
flect a significant policy judgment by Government officials
whether or not the contractor rather than those officials
developed the design. In addition, it does not seem to us
sound policy to penalize, and thus deter, active contractor
participation in the design process, placing the contractor
at risk unless it identifies all design defects.3 80
Consequently, the Court determined that the manufac-
s76 Id.
377 Id. at 2513-14.
370 Id. at 2515.
379 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982); see also supra note 42 for the text of this sec-
tion of the FTCA.
380 Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2518.
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turer would be immune from liability under the govern-
ment contractor defense if the standards outlined in
McKay38 t were met.5 2 The Court, however, vacated and
remanded the case to the court of appeals to determine
whether or not the elements had been met.3 8 3
The effect of the Supreme Court decision of Boyle is not
precisely clear. Several areas, however, are extremely im-
portant and worth noting. First, the Court established
that because of the "uniquely federal interests" in cases
involving defective military aircraft, federal law, not state
law, would apply. 8 4 Further, the Court acknowledged
that the government contractor defense standard to be
used in these cases would be the standard used by the
Fourth Circuit'in Boyle and the Ninth Circuit in McKay.3 15
This federal concern eliminated the question of whether
tort or contract law would govern the claim, since the
Supreme Court was in essence stating that the law of Boyle
governed all defective military aircraft claims.3 86
After 30 years of attempting to-establish a uniform stan-
dard for use in military aircraft disasters, the Court ulti-
mately accomplished this goal in Boyle. Nevertheless,
although it seems that all questions were finally answered
in Boyle, one critical question remains: Have the courts, in
establishing the government contractor defense, over-
38, See supra note 174 and accompanying text for the McKay standards.
382 Boyl, 108 S. Ct. at 2518
3s' Id. at 2519.
394 Id. at 2514-15.
3- Id. at 2518; see infra note 392 for the scope of the standard.
386 Id. The Supreme Court, by determining that federal law, not state law, ap-
plied rendered the choice of law issue irrelevant, thus displacing the entire body
of applicable state law with federal law. Id. The Court did this so that a uniform
standard would govern all defective military aircraft when the defect is the result
of the government's design or approval. Id. at 2516. The Court noted that the
cases are cited in the text of its opinion involving the civil liabilities of federal
officials for actions during the course of their duty "merely to demonstrate that
the liability of independent contractors performing work for the Federal Govern-
ment, like the liability of federal officials, is an area of uniquely federal interest."
Id. at 2514 n. 1. This rationalization of the Court continued, the Court stating
"[i]n some cases, for example where the federal interest requires a uniform rule,
the entire body of state law applicable to the area conflicts and is replaced by
federal rules." Id. at 2516.
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stepped their boundaries so as to unconstitutionally vio-
late the separation of powers doctrine?
VI. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Looking at the history of the government contractor de-
fense, it is apparent that the defense has been premised
upon a public policy rationale 387 rather than reliance
upon any statutory regulation established by Congress. 8 8
The most obvious rationale behind its development is
cost-benefit analysis, or what it might cost the government
if this defense was not established.3 8 9 The Supreme Court
in Boyle, for example, rationalized that, based upon this
analysis, the Constitution and the laws of the United
States empowered it to create "federal common law. ' 390
This argument, however, creates a direct contradiction
between the Court's holding in Boyle 3 9 ' and the decision
that Boyle relied upon, namely Tozer.392 In Tozer, the court
held:
The judicial branch is by design the least involved in mili-
-87 See McKay, 704 F.2d at 449 (discussed supra notes 171-173 and accompany-
ing text); see also Tozer, 792 F.2d at 405-06 (discussed supra notes 268-270 and
accompanying text); Boyle v. United Technologies, 792 F.2d at 413, vacated and re-
manded, 108 S. Ct. at 2518 (discussed supra notes 377-381 and accompanying text).
38 See Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2519-20 (Brennan, Marshall and, Blackmun, JJ., dis-
senting; Stevens, J., separate dissent) (all four dissenters emphasized the lack of
statutory basis for the majority's decision).
389 Id. at 2518; see supra note 380 and accompanying text.
390 See 108 S. Ct. at 2514, 2518. The dissent emphasized that federal common
law may displace state law only in "few and restricted" instances. Id. at 2521
(Brennan,J., dissenting) (citing Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963)).
108 S. Ct. at 2518. The Supreme Court in its holding states:
We agree with the scope of displacement adopted by the Fourth Cir-
cuit here, which is also that adopted by the Ninth Circuit, see McKay
v. Rockwell Int'l Corp..... .Liability for design defects in military
equipment cannot be imposed, pursuant to state law, when (1) the
United States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the
equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier
warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the equip-
ment that were known to the supplier but not to the United States.
Id. These principles were first outlined by McKay, 704 F.2d at 451, and then sub-
sequently relied upon in Tozer and Boyle v. United Technologies. See Boyle v. United
Technologies, 792 F.2d at 414.
392 792 F.2d at 403.
1988] GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
tary matters. "The complex, subtle, and professional de-
cisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and
control of a military force are essentially professional mili-
tary judgments, subject always to civilian control of the
Legislative and Executive Branches."393
By determining that federal common law should apply
and by establishing when it should apply, the Court, in
essence, was making complex decisions that the Fourth
Circuit in Tozer, the Supreme Court in other cases,394 and
the United States Constitution3 9 5 all state that the Court is
not in the position to make.
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress
the power to raise and support armies, and to provide and
maintain a navy.396 It further gives Congress the sole
right to make rules for the government and regulation of
the land and naval forces.397 The constitutional power of
Congress is broad and sweeping, and "the lack of compe-
tence on the part of the courts is marked. ' 398 This limita-
tion on the judiciary is logical, as judges possess no power
to declare war or to raise, support and maintain an army
or navy.399 Likewise, "[t]he judicial branch contains no
Department of Defense or Armed Services Committee or
other ongoing fund of expertise on which personnel may
draw. ' 40 0 The courts must, therefore, be very careful not
to substitute their "judgment of what is desirable for that
of Congress, or . . . [their] evaluation of evidence for a
reasonable evaluation by the Legislative Branch." '40 '
When the courts are asked to create an entirely new doc-
trine to answer questions of policy about which Congress
3.3 Id. at 405 (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973)).
3- See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65, 69-70, 82-83 (1981); Gilligan v.
Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973); see also Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93
(1953).
:95 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
116 Id.
39I Id.; see also Rostker, 453 U.S. at 59.
s98 Rostker, 453 U.S. at 65.
s- Tozer, 792 F.2d at 405.
40 Id.
4o Rostker, 453 U.S. at 68.
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has not spoken, the courts "have a special duty to identify
the proper decisionmaker before trying to make the
proper decision. '40 2
Based on these principles, the judiciary has a duty to
refrain from interfering with congressional rights when
dealing with the government contractor defense. By es-
tablishing this defense without relying upon any act of
Congress, the judiciary has stepped on the most funda-
mental right of Congress, namely the right to regulate the
military.40 3 Immunity for a contractor lacks both the posi-
tive legal basis and the presumption that it furthers the
congressional will.40 4 Consequently, Constitutional imple-
mentation of the government contractor defense,
although it may or may not have some sound basis for its
application, is constitutionally more appropriate "for
those who write the laws, rather than for those who inter-
pret them. '4 5 This follows because "[t]he ultimate re-
sponsibility for these decisions is appropriately vested in
the branches of the government which are periodically
subject to electoral accountability. It is this power of
oversight and control of military force by elected repre-
sentatives and officials which underlies our entire consti-
tutional system .... 406
4 2 See Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2528 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
403 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2519-20 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
4 Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2519-20 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
40.1 Id. at 2528 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S.
507, 511 (1954)); Gilman, 347 U.S. at 511-13.
- Gilligan v. Morgan 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973).
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